On Friday (11/12), Institute of International Studies Universitas Gadjah Mada (IIS UGM) organized another discussion forum, the 12^th and the last Beyond the Great Wall (BTGW) of 2020. This forum discussed “China 2020: Flashbacks and Future Challenges”. Speaking were Arum Dyah Rinjani (fresh graduate of Department of International Relations Universitas Mataram), Lazarus Andja Karunia (part-time staff for Direktorat Riset Industri UGM), and Dr. Nur Rachmat Yuliantoro (lecturer at Department of International Relations UGM).

Arum Dyah Rinjani commenced the forum with her presentation on “Maritime Environmental Security: Implications of Nine-dash Line Claims on Maritime Environmental Degradation in South China Sea”. China’s nine-dash line claims steered several Chinese policies on the territory, causing a handful of maritime conflicts. From 2009-2016, 8.795 news on maritime conflicts were released, in contrast with mere 25 on maritime environmental security and resource protection in the area.

While most of China’s activities in SCS relate to maritime security, at least two of them contributed to severe environmental degradation: land reclamation and overfishing. China has been doing land reclamation since 2013, making up 3.200 ha of artificial island. The activity destroyed reefs, increased muddiness, released harmful chemicals, created sedimentary sands which killed underwater organisms, and inflicted several destructions beyond repair. Meanwhile, China used large ships, dangerous substances, and heavy equipment in fishing. China’s overfishing caused decrease in fish stocks and catches, endangered biodiversity, harmed reefs, and sparked clashes with other countries. Ecologically, the phenomenon made one of the worst overfishing and reef degradation records in history. It is 99% China’s fault, Arum claimed.

Lazarus Andja continued with discussions on “Great Peek Forward: How Surveillance Technology Shaped China’s Response Towards Coronavirus”. By surveillance, Andja meant structured observation. China has frequently utilized surveillance technology, even prior to the pandemic. There were at least 2.58 million cameras in Chongqing used to observe 15.35 million people, particularly for law enforcement and automatic response for violations through the social credit system. The same was also done in Xinjiang to supervise people and limit mobility. However, surveillance was still localized and yet to reach national scale.

To better understand the case, Andja used the post-panoptic surveillance concept. It means the use of several separate surveillance tools which, at the end, will consolidate into one strategy. Post-panoptic surveillance is not limited to physical institutions like schools, prisons, and factories, hence the lack of awareness of the object while being observed. Moreover, it is used not to control, but to discipline. Three aspects make up post-panoptic surveillance: surveillant assemblage, deterritorialization, and reassembly.

Surveillant assemblage means the tools used to execute surveillance. In China, it includes color coding, drones, social credit system, and social media supervision. Alipay Health Code uses color coding to indicate different health levels in Hangzhou to limit mobility. People in Hangzhou can only go to green-coded areas in the app. Travelling to yellow areas will end up with requirement of one-week quarantine, while visit to red areas require two-week quarantine. Moreover, drones function to assist observation and give out reminders to obey health protocols. Failure to obey will result in deduction of social credit points, while good deeds—i.e. serving as front-liner health workers—will be rewarded with extra points. The more points one has, the more social opportunities will be available. In addition, the government uses social media surveillance to sensor critics and rebellious acts through keyword filtering.

Deterritorialization is data gathering from physical space and creation of individual data doubles. In deterritorializing, the government partnered with at least four parties: (1) with Alibaba who assisted data gathering regarding individual health risk; (2) with Baidu’s AI technology Intelligent Changsan which processes citizen reports by phone; (3) with SkyNet who assisted the police through CCTV observation; (4) and with MicroMultiCopter which supplied 100 drones to 11 cities.

Lastly, reassembly is the process of gathering data doubles in accordance with the need of users. In China, amongst the various users are the war room (which is the center of city and village level supervision), the central government, and the police. That said, the people’s biggest fear is surveillance creep or data abuse by the authorities.

Dr. Nur Rachmat Yuliantoro delivered the last presentation on “Technology and Daily Lives of the Chinese: Is It Convenience, Fear, or Something Else?”. He showed different pictures (some of them taken directly by him) to show changes in daily conduct supported by the advancement of technology in China. The first picture exhibits a street merchant in China providing a barcode as means of payment, indicating China’s progress towards a cashless society. The second picture showcased wireless charging facilities in lamp posts across Wuhan.

The next picture captured Meituan Dianping app—similar to Gojek, providing several services in one platform—and Ele.Me—which delivers food with drones—that facilitates convenience for Chinese people. However, as much as it is efficient, the existence of these digital convenience sparked protests from partner restaurants because of its high fee. There’s also growing concerns of data abuse.

Moreover, technology allows everyone to easily access many services and do many things through mobile phones, including livestreaming features. Nonetheless, again, such convenience brings new concerns: recently, there was a man in China who got imprisoned after exposing personal data of a woman recently infected by COVID-19 following club visits. Nowadays, China also adopts face recognition technology that is advanced enough to identify masked faces.

While all the hi-tech tools mentioned above accommodate comfort and efficiency, they also pose obstacles to certain groups of the society, in particular the elderly.

Writer : Denise Michelle

Editor : Medisita Febrina

On 20 November 2020, Institute of International Studies Universitas Gadjah Mada organized its 11^th edition of Beyond the Great Wall via Zoom discussing “The Rise and Future of China’s Power Projection”. Invited in the forum were Angelo Wijaya, founder of Student Association of Belt and Road Initiative (SABRI) Chapter UGM and Demas Nauvarian, a international relations graduate student in Universitas Airlangga.Angelo presented his review of the book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap, while Demas delivered his presentation discussing “The Evolution of Chinese Geostrategic Thinking and Strategic Culture: From Sea Power to Space Power.” Indrawan Jatmika, researcher for IIS UGM, helped moderate the discussion.

Angelo began his review stating that in the near future, China is going to become the number one strongest power in the world as its economy will rise in 2024, even topping the US. Such potential certainly becomes a threat to the US, hence the US’ tendencies to disagree and contend with China, and eventually waging the trade war. The book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap attempts to complement Thucydides’ argument in his legendary tale The Peloponnesian War. Graham Allison, the author of the book, introduces the term “Thucydides’ trap” to describe the tendency to wage war when a new power emerges to replace existing ones. The argument is not entirely correct as, in reality, not all countries have such tendency.

One question, then, emerges: will China and the US be able to survive the Thucydides’ trap? Angelo laid out a few points that the US needs to pay close attention to. First, they need to reconsider and clarify their vital interests. In this case, is the South China Sea dispute of top priority? Moreover, they need to examine more closely what the Chinese are doing, particularly in regards to its foreign policy. They will, then, need to proceed with the strategies—which, in its formulation, should consider conditions at the macro level—accordingly. Lastly, domestic challenges should also be taken into consideration in the formulation of foreign policy. Said challenges include the matter of trust given by domestic institutions, social political system, and the general public.

Angelo wrapped up his speech with a call to perceive China’s rise holistically; basically, China’s rise also caters to the US interest. “In its path to becoming a new power, it’s wise to recall this quote from the Spiderman movie, with a great power comes greater responsibility,” Angelo said.

The second session focused on China’s rarely discussed space and naval power. In explaining China’s grand strategy to harmonize their power instruments, Demas showcased that there were two approaches the Chinese use: (1) the geostrategic—prioritizing geographic factors—and military approach; (2) the strategic cultural approach which deals with geographic and historic aspects as means to achieve welfare. Just as every country prioritizes certain issues in the purpose of increasing their power, China prioritizes its naval sector.

Speaking on naval strategy, Demas explained that two theoretical approaches could be utilized in examining a state’s classical sea power. First, the Mahan approach believes that naval strategy ought to focus on navy modernization. Hence, use of the navy, strength, and sea control constitute the most important factors. The second approach, Corbett’s maritime strategy, highlights the need to combine land and sea factors to control the sea. Military and civil elements, land and sea power, as well as sea command are crucial. Since adopting the naval sector strategy, China repeatedly used different approaches in accordance to its ever-changing leadership goals. As of now, China’s strategy focuses on defending what they own and claiming on whatever they don’t. The strategy explicitly exhibits how China tends to be assertive in border issues, most importantly in the South China Sea dispute.

Meanwhile, Demas argued that China’s space strategy depends on its maritime strategy. Currently, the Chinese space force is focusing on various cooperation efforts with other countries for development. While its gradually rising space force seemingly threatens western countries, it is important to note that China’s strategies in achieving its goals always differ with that of the west’. In its strategy formulation, China perceives the world in two different ways. One way is through the lens of Confucianism which avoids use of military means to fulfill national goals. Another way is the realist para bellum perspective which believes that the nature of international politics is anarchic, hence the need to wage war. China sees from both perspectives in arranging its grand strategy of space and naval power.