IIS Fortnightly Review #5 | Edisi 1 – 15 Juni 2021

Our fifth edition of Fortnightly Review is out now! Articles featured in this edition are:

• Colombia and Its Growing Mass Movement: “They Can’t Take It Anymore” (V. Winona)
• Why COVID-19 Vaccination in Poorer Nations Has Slowed, Posing Global Risks (S. Aryawangsa)
• How COVID-19 Pandemic Could Impede The Catch-Up of Poor Countries With Rich Ones (M. Yansverio)
• Global Nursing Shortage and Health Inequality (N. Raharema)

Our Fortnightly Review is also mobile friendly! Access the review throught : https://simpan.ugm.ac.id/s/GnuzILvb6SfY5mL

IIS Fortnightly Review #4 | Edisi 16 – 31 Mei 2021

Our fourth edition of Fortnightly Review is out now! Articles featured in this edition are:

• ‘Social Media is The Mass Protest’: Solidarity with Palestinians Grows Online (M. Yansverio)
• Drown in Water, Still Die of Thirst: Jakarta’s Water Issues (R. Puspita)
• US’ Biden Administration Approved $735 Million Weapons Sale to Israel (N. Raharema)
• ‘Diggin in, Myanmar’s Military Junta Detains US Journalist’: A Sign of Government Weakness (F. Gabriel)

Access the review throug : https://simpan.ugm.ac.id/s/NXd5uTKVnbsIegU

IIS Fortnightly Review #3 | Edisi 1 – 15 Mei 2021

IIS Fortnightly Review edisi 1-15 Mei 2021 dapat diunduh melalui tautan berikut : https://simpan.ugm.ac.id/s/1Y2cBVRupMdlYU3

IIS Fortnightly Review #2 | Edisi 15 – 30 April 2021

IIS Fortnightly Review edisi 15-30 April 2021 dapat diunduh melalui tautan berikut : https://simpan.ugm.ac.id/s/JxPvO0hLQShkddz

Sistem Senjata Otonom Mematikan : Sebuah Acuan Dasar Untuk Kajian Dan Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia

Klik tautan berikut untuk mengunduh file Sistem Senjata Otonom Mematikan : Sebuah Acuan Dasar Untuk Kajian Dan Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia [tersedia dalam versi Bahasa Indonesia dan versi Bahasa Inggris] :

http://bit.ly/PrimerKillerRobots

IIS Fortnightly Review #1 | Edisi 1 – 14 April 2021

IIS Fortnightly Review edisi 1-14 April 2021 dapat diunduh melalui tautan berikut :

https://simpan.ugm.ac.id/s/medP14b9Mu2CGUS

It’s Time to Rethink Jakarta’s Water Governance

As if the COVID-19 crisis is not enough, Jakarta is now also facing another flood catastrophe. Most recently, flooding affected around 200 neighborhood units (RT) and forced more than 1,000 people to evacuate their homes.

Indonesia is currently facing a series of disasters including floods, landslides, whirlwinds and extreme droughts in some parts of the country. According to the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB), the number of disasters has nearly tripled in the past five years from around 1,664 in 2015 to 3,023 in 2020.

Of course the usual culprit of these disasters is climate change, which according to Prof. Edvin Aldrian of the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) is caused by environmental changes and degradation within and without the country.

While it is not untrue, there is more than meets the eye: it is the failure of urban water planning and governance which has contributed to Jakarta’s persistent flooding. Overlooking the root causes will not only undermine the deeper issue, but also shift the attention to quick and temporary technological fixes that only exacerbate the environmental catastrophe.

The flooding in Jakarta this year was timely as Vox, a US media outlet, published a video report on Jakarta’s environmental crisis, which has caused the city to sink as fast as 25 centimeters annually. The report associates this crisis with Dutch-inherited segregated water infrastructure, massive groundwater exploitation and rapid urban development leading to a proliferation of concrete that prevents rainwater from replenishing water lost from the city’s aquifer layers.

These issues, however, cannot be solved with simple technological fixes. Rather they require a rearrangement of water governance that has proven to have failed to provide equal and sustainable access to the city’s population.

This failure is evident in three aspects: the exclusion of the urban poor from the governance process, the blurry lines between rights and responsibilities of the stakeholders, and the elite-centric decision-making process.

In an effort to do so, we can start by rethinking our water governance approach that currently focuses on the centralized water infrastructure to also incorporate a variety of everyday water practices. These have been chosen by people either because they are excluded from the network or because their access is limited due to the weak water pressure, or the unreliable and low-quality supply of the available network.

The reality of water governance in Jakarta is not reflected in the networked infrastructure that only covers 65 percent of the population with the majority of customers coming from middle to lower income households. Considering service unreliability that is not consistent with constant tariff increases, even those who are connected also fulfill their water needs either from groundwater, rainwater harvesting or bottled water.

According to the report from Amrta Institute, more than 60 percent of the city’s water needs are fulfilled by groundwater, which serves nearly two-thirds of the city’s water consumption, or around 630 million cubic metre out of 1 billion m3/year.

Unfortunately, the discussion on Jakarta’s water governance has been biased toward the centralized infrastructure, which is problematic for three main reasons. First, it reinforces a legacy of the colonial government water development planning, which is socially and geographically fragmented. This has inherently prevented the urban poor, especially those who live in informal settlements, from both accessing the piped water infrastructure and participating in the governance process.

Second, centralized piped water infrastructure is often used as a justification for private sector participation due the government’s lack of capacity to fund capital costs. However, as evident in Jakarta, neither public nor private operators have successfully ensured adequate and sustainable water service provision for the population, even those who adhere to pro-poor initiatives.

Lastly, the focus on centralized infrastructure promotes the development of big-infrastructural projects as a band-aid for the environmental catastrophe while neglecting the underlying issue of water governance failure. For example, the construction of a USD$40 billion giant sea wall to prevent seawater from overflowing into the already sinking city does not address the underlying problems and often comes at a cost of forced eviction of many informal settlements which burdens the already excluded urban poor.

Thus, there is a need to look beyond the networked water infrastructure by considering everyday water practices in which people interact within and outside the centralized infrastructure. Such practices include buying water from neighbors, collecting water from public stand-pipes, purchasing from pushcart vendors and extracting groundwater from shallow or deep wells.

Looking at these everyday practices will allow us to unveil the different manifestations of water inequalities in terms of distribution, recognition and participation. For example, research by Kooy and Furlong in 2018 found that over-abstraction of groundwater in rich neighborhoods has led to salinization of shallow groundwater and land-subsidence in poor neighborhoods, exposing the urban poor to higher risk of flooding and poorer water quality.

Equally important, paying attention to everyday water practices will not only allow us to understand the different manifestations of urban water inequality but also enable us to capture local knowledge and practices that have been filling the gap left by the centralized water infrastructure. This will counter the disempowering image of the urban poor as a passive recipient or victim of Jakarta’s unequal water governance.

This article does not seek to diminish the importance of centralized piped water infrastructure or the urgency for people to be connected to a piped water source, instead it seeks to highlight the need to look beyond the centralized network in order to develop a more holistic understanding of Jakarta’s water governance.

Hopefully, this will lead to the creation of an inclusive and sustainable urban water governance that allows for more equitable access to water, increasing recognition and larger space for participation especially for marginalized communities including the poor in informal settlements, women, migrants and the disabled.

 

This article has been published by the Jakarta Post and can also be accessed via the following link: https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2021/02/26/its-time-to-rethink-jakartas-water-governance.html


Writer : Marwa

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

Damai Pangkal Damai : Membela Demokrasi di Tengah Pandemi – Refleksi Aksi Nirkekerasan di Indonesia dan Dunia 2020

 


Klik tautan berikut untuk mengunduh file buku Damai Pangkal Damai : Membela Demokrasi di Tengah Pandemi – Refleksi Aksi Nirkekerasan di Indonesia dan Dunia 2020 [Tersedia dalam versi Bahasa Indonesia dan Bahasa Inggris] : http://bit.ly/DPDRefleksiAksiNirkekerasan

The Striking Generational Divide, Explained

Generational “finger-pointing” is not a novel concept and has existed for centuries within multitude of generations, each blaming the other for issues and ideas neither generation wants to take accountability for.  Both Gen Y (people born between the years 1980-1994) and Gen Z (people born between the years 1995-2010) have formed an alliance to push back on the older generations, specifically the Baby Boomers. A clash of ideas and a point of difference of views on society has struck tension between generations, preventing a progressive society from fully forming.

The younger generation is racially diverse, environmentally and socially conscious, and have a clear vision for how they want their future to unfold (Valencia-Garcia 2020). However, it is apparent that the ideas of the younger generations contrast sharply with older generations, who tend to reject policy reforms or ideas presented by the youth. A difference in “expectations of the future, ethics and politics” (Birnstengel 2019) has formed a generational split and prevents society from progressing entirely. The generational divide is not only based on family morals and ethics but is also an accumulation of different people living fundamentally different lives and experiencing different circumstances in general. Technology and politics are two key factors that have continually evolved through generations and have influenced generation’s perspective on society deeply (Birnstengel 2019).

Today, the debate on generationalism is centered around how a nation should look and exactly what kinds of people should be a part of that nation. Millennials and Gen Z have been defined by the rise of the internet and identity politics. They grew up with the internet, but also remember a life in analogue (Frey 2020). They have experienced economic crises and watched the War on Terror unfold, and as a result are concerned for their futures due to the large influence capitalist and traditionalist institutions still have on society (Valencia-Garcia 2020). Older generations are wanting to protect these outdated institutions that uphold their own old-fashioned values in order to push their agendas on the nation. Pew Research centre research found that the upcoming younger generation was the most ethically and racially diverse generation to date, fundamentally driving their progressive attitudes (Birnstengel 2019).

A distinct issue that has caused great generational divide is the climate crisis. Younger people across the world have grown up with more exposure to the effects of climate change than the older generations (Cohen 2019). Thus, young adults in current day are of higher concern about climate change as they understand the implications better and are more educated on the topic. The attitudes of younger generations and their beliefs has pushed an agenda to resolve the climate crisis dramatically, creating very real social change that is being reflected in policy changes around the world (Cohen 2019). Although the impacts of climate change are ever present and should be dealt with immediately, the push for policy change around the environment is a reflection of the youth’s priorities for society. Along with climate change, issues such as racial justice and social inclusivity are other examples of younger generations pushing important issues.

Older generations accuse younger generations of naivety and younger generations don’t understand their parochialism. Potentially, a middle ground could be met where older generations feel their needs are being fulfilled while society continues to progress as a whole. However, generational gaps will continue to arise if unity is not formed or perceptions do not alter to accommodate for one another

 

REFERENCES:

Birnstengel, G 2019, Boomer Blaming, Finger Pointing and The Generational Divide, Forbes, retrieved February 2 2021

Cohen, S 2019, The Age Gap in Environmental Politics, Earth Institute, Columbia University, retrieved February 2 2021

Frey, W 2020, The 2020s can end America’s generational divide in politics, Brookings, retrieved February 2 2021

Valencia-Garcia, L 2020, Understanding Today’s Generational Divide, Fair Observer, retrieved February 2 2021


Writer : Emily Camilleri

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

Military Coup 2021 and the Stalemate of Democratization Process in Myanmar

The dream of becoming a fully democratic country is perhaps still a long way off for people in Myanmar. A coup or a seizure of power by the military has occurred, marking a sign of stalemate in the democratization process in Myanmar for the last decade. On February 1st, 2021, local news outlets and various international media reported that Aung San Suu Kyi as the state counselor and Myanmar’s de facto leader had been detained by the Myanmar military (Regan, Olarn, and Westcott, 2021). Not only Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, the leader of the government, and several other government officials have also been detained. In addition, the military also declared a state of emergency and took over power for at least the next year (DW, 2021).

 The military claims that the arrests are related to an alleged fraud in November 2020 election. In the election, The National League for Democracy, a political party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a significant victory by obtaining 396 out of 476 seats in the combined lower and upper houses of Parliament. This victory is certainly a threat in itself, at least in terms military’s guaranteed 25% parliamentary seats (Shine OO, 2021).  Although currently the conflict is still limited to the elite level, the impact of this struggle for power has begun to  spread towards citizen of Myanmar with the broadcast disruptions of the Myanmar National TV station and Myanmar National Radio. It was also reported that there was internet network disruption in the capital Yangon on Tuesday morning with network connections dropping by 75 percent (DW, 2021).

The democratic crisis that occurred in Myanmar received strong reactions from various international actors. The United States threatened to take action and ensure that Myanmar’s military would get consequences if they did not comply with democratic principles. UN Secretary General Antonio Gutieress also criticized the incident, saying that it was a serious blow for Myanmar democracy. Various criticisms have also come from international humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that have been calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and denounced access to communications and internet networks (Al Jazeera, 2021).

Myanmar’s Pseudo Democratization Process

This recent event is certainly a major stumbling block for the struggle towards democracy in Myanmar. Optimism for the creation of a democratic civilian government must now be confronted with the existence of the military which has again shown its influence in Myanmar’s political struggle of power. Whereas, after the political reforms carried out by President U Thein Sein which was marked by changing the mode of government from a total military junta to a hybrid civil-military administration in 2011, optimism for the new face of democracy in Myanmar was getting bigger, both domestically and internationally. With various concessions granted in 2011 including commitment to democratic elections and loosening media control, political spaces that have been controlled by the military were becoming an open contestation for civilians to take part in politics. The peak was in 2015 when the National League of Democracy won the election with a significant number of votes. As a result, the NLD effectively took state legislative power from the military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and officially granted the reins of executive power to civilians (Ko, 2018).

Although it appears that there has been a marked development in the democratic process after the election of civilian leaders through democratic elections in 2015, the reality is that the democratic process in Myanmar is far from being successful and completed. It even tends to appear as pseudo democratization. The point of pseudo-democratization here is that although on the surface there was a power transition from military to civilian, there has never been any attempt to reduce military power either in any level of the government. In the 2008 constitution, which is still in effect today, for example, the military is automatically guaranteed to get 25 percent of seats in the Myanmar parliament. The same constitution also states that every legislative decision must get at least 75 percent of the members of the Myanmar parliament. With the automatic allotment of 25 percent of seats for the military, it means that all forms of Myanmar legislative decisions must be approved by the Military faction in parliament to fulfil the minimum requirement of 75 percent, and the Military has the opportunity to veto all decisions discussed in the legislative process (Miclat, 2020). Moreover, the 2008 constitution also gives the Military control to key ministries such as the ministry of defense, the ministry of border affairs, and the ministry of home affairs (Turner, 2011). In addition, the military still has a strong influence on Myanmar’s bureaucracy where 90 percent of public officials and 80 percent of ambassadors are ex-military personnel, so that a more democratic political climate will be difficult to create (Ko, 2018).

To further understand the democratization process in Myanmar, we must also look at the history of the political reforms that took place in 2011. Although during that period President Thein Sein received a lot of praise from international community for his decision to encourage political liberalization that has reduced repression and created avenues for civil participation in the institutions, the main motive of the reforms is still being debated. As summarized by Bunte and Dosch (2015), political scientists see that political reform carried out by Myanmar was a “survival strategy of the quasi-military government” to overcome the danger of factionalism and to increase regime durability by creating power-sharing institutions. Several other political scientists said that this strategy was a military effort to increase Myanmar’s legitimacy in the international world as well as to improve Myanmar’s worrying socio-political conditions with international sanctions and the post-Cyclone Nargis recovery conditions that ravaged the country in 2008 (Bunte and Dosch, 2015).

By looking from the history of the democratization process in Myanmar especially related to the 2011 event, we can conclude that in fact this political reform is the result of generosity from the previous military government, therefore it is very likely that one day the military government will take back the “gift” if something does not go according to their expectations. Moreover, the bureaucratic climate in fact, which is still controlled by many military elements, will certainly make it easier for the military to mobilize its strength to take over power in the future. In contrast to other countries, for example, such as Indonesia, which demilitarized post-reform political elements in 1998 by eliminating military dual function, efforts to reduce military influence in Myanmar politics were minimal, as evidenced by the persistence of the tight military control on the aspects of Myanmar’s political life both in the legislative sector with a 25 percent military quota in parliament, as well as the quota of three important ministries in the executive sphere, namely the Ministry of Defense which has authority over Myanmar Armed Forces, Ministry of Border Affairs which controls border affairs of the country, the Ministry of Home Affairs which is in charge of administrative affairs and control of the police, narrows the space for civil society in political affairs in the country so that their resistance to political crises such as a coup became very vulnerable (Prameswaran, 2020).

From this event we can see that this military coup is an attempt by the Myanmar military to take back what they consider to be their right – full power and influence in all aspects of the life of the Myanmar people – as well as preventing the possibility of developing an external power that can rival their existence. The NLD’s landslide victory in the Myanmar elections, as well as the decline in the votes obtained by the USDP as the party backed by the military (The Irrawady, 2020), certainly is a big enough blow to the military’s existence so that they must take certain steps to maintain their power by carrying out a forced takeover of power and alleging that election fraud has occurred.

For Myanmar’s civil society, they do not have much choice but to wait for the situation to subside and hope that political stability in their country can be quickly upheld. The absence of Aung San Suu Kyi and several other civilian political figures who were detained by the military would have been a major blow to the struggle of civil society because so far they have relied on Aung San Suu Kyi as a political mouthpiece for the majority of Myanmar civil society. The strong control in every aspect of society as well as the fear of persecution, intimidation, and the silencing of freedom of speech which was marked by the shutdown of television, radio and internet broadcasts in Myanmar became an obstacle to civil society’s resistance efforts to the political crisis that was happening on their homeland.

What Myanmar Coup 2021 means for the international community?

With the limited number of actions that civil society groups can take in Myanmar, there are currently great hopes placed on the international community to be able to take certain steps to save the democratic process in that country. Criticism has already been made, but of course this will not be enough without being accompanied by firm steps that will put great pressure on the existence of military forces in Myanmar.

The biggest challenge faced by the United States as a country that has been committed to promoting and ensuring the smooth running of the democratization process around the world. Moreover, this event is the first challenge for the new government under President Joe Biden who was appointed at the beginning of the year. After the resignation of Donald Trump, who tends to have an inward looking policy, the United States is currently required to show its hegemony as a leading country, especially in the democratization process which has been their commitment. But of course these steps will not be that easy. In Myanmar’s affairs, America must face China, which has a big interest in the country, especially in the economic sector related to oil and natural gas. In contrast to the United States, which immediately gave a strong reaction, China prefers to be more careful in responding to this case while calling on the warring parties to resolve the political crisis with a peaceful manner (Wintour, 2021).

ASEAN as a regional organization and the countries that are members of it, especially Brunei Darussalam, which has just been entrusted with the ASEAN Chairmanship starting January 1, 2021 also faced the challenge of being able to help resolve this political crisis. Even though there is the principle of non-interference that must be upheld, however, ASEAN countries must be able to play an active role in efforts to prevent potential conflicts. For example, ASEAN as an organization as well as certain ASEAN countries must be able to encourage and facilitate peaceful discussions between conflicting parties if needed. In this case ASEAN is required to be able to create a just, democratic, harmonious and gender-sensitive environment in accordance with the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law in accordance with ASEAN Vision 2025. But this will not be an easy thing for ASEAN. In fact, shortly after the event there were various reactions from its member countries. Brunei as chairman of ASEAN, followed by various countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore through an official statement, has raised their concern and urged that this issue can be resolved peacefully in accordance with applicable legal principles. Even so, several countries including Cambodia and Thailand chose not to comment further and considered that this matter was an internal Myanmar affair and they considered that they had no right to interfere either in the ASEAN framework or in the bilateral framework. It will be difficult for ASEAN to think of a multilateral framework that can help resolve this crisis if its members are not in one voice in responding to this issue.

Historically, pressure from the international community has proven to be able to push for policy reforms that are considered de facto starting the democratization process in Myanmar in 2011. In the current  situation, when the people of Myanmar are again facing a political crisis caused by the excessive display of political power from the military, the role of the international community in giving pressure to the military action in Myanmar will be crucial in ensuring the political stability and the sustainability of the democratization process in Myanmar.

 

References

 

Al Jazeera. (2021). ‘Serious Blow to Democracy’: World Condemns Myanmar Military Coup. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/1/world-reacts-to-military-coup-in-myanmar

Bünte, M., & Dosch, J. (2015). Myanmar: Political Reforms and the Recalibration of External Relations. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 34(2), 3-19.

Channel News Asia. (2021). ASEAN Chair Brunei Calls for ‘Dialogue, Reconciliation and Return to Normalcy’ in Myanmar. Retrieved from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-asean-aung-san-suu-kyi-military-coup-14087150

Deutsche Welle. (2021). Myanmar Coup: Aung San Suu Kyi Detained as Military Seizes Power. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-coup-aung-san-suu-kyi-detained-as-military-seizes-power/a-56400678

Helen Regan, Kocha Olarn, & Westcott, B. (2021). Myanmar’s Military Seizes Power in Coup after Detaining Leader Aung San Suu Kyi and Ruling Party Politicians. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/31/world/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-detained-intl/index.html

Irrawaddy, T. (2020). Myanmar’s 2020 General Election Results in Numbers. Election 2020. Retrieved from https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/myanmars-2020-general-election-results-numbers.html?fbclid=IwAR0uo7ZdreRaaGyiJ-nnXdvJqbhgYcD-pTOcT0KKGqTQerFoBHiNHwFOexk

Ko, A. K. (2018). Democratisation in Myanmar: Glue or Gloss? Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3d07eb88-d4f1-de81-40d1-032ec67a3cb8&groupId=288143

Miclat, G. (2020). Challenges to Democracy and Hopes for Peace and Justice in Myanmar. The Debate. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/challenges-to-democracy-and-hopes-for-peace-and-justice-in-myanmar/

Oo, A. S. (2021). Myanmar Military Denies Coup Threats over Vote Fraud Claims. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/constitutions-myanmar-elections-asia-min-aung-hlaing-1d8af462424d818f96e88dc6ed115dc1

Parameswaran, P. (2020). What Will Myanmar’s New Home Minister Mean for the Country’s Security and Politics? ASEAN Beat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/what-will-myanmars-new-home-minister-mean-for-the-countrys-security-and-politics/

Turnell, S. (2012). Myanmar in 2011: Confounding Expectations. Asian Survey, 52(1), 157-164.

Wintour, P. (2021). Myanmar Coup: US and China Divided in Response to Army Takeover. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/01/myanmar-coup-us-and-china-divided-in-response-to-army-takeover-aung-san-suu-kyi


Writer : Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti