Entries by iis.fisipol

[RECAP] Beyond the Great Wall #13: China and Maritime Sovereignty

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On Friday (26/02), Institute of International Studies UGM organized the 13th edition of Beyond the Great Wall Forum, titled “China and  Maritime Sovereignty”. The forum was held online via Zoom Meeting platform. In this event, BTGW invited Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, a professor and researcher for the Center for Sustainable Ocean Policy in the Faculty of Law of Universitas Indonesia. Aristyo’s presentation was titled “China’s New Coast Guard Law: Illegal and Escalatory”. This forum was moderated by Nur Rachmat Yuliantoro, a professor in the International Relations Department UGM.

Last February, the Chinese government has officially authorized China’s New Coast Guard Law. This legislation allows China’s Coast Guard (CCG) to mobilize all capabilities (including the use of force) against parties that are deemed to be interfering with China’s maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction. According to Aristyo’s presentation, this new legislation violates international law and would in fact, escalate tensions among bordering states. At the beginning of his presentation, Aristyo explained that the CCG has a long history in its development. Since 2013, the CCG Bureau was formed to unify China’s legal maritime entities, titled the “Five Dragons, ” including China Marine Surveillance, Chinese Coast Guard, Chinese Maritime Patrol, China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and General Administration of Customs. This effort is part of China’s grand ambition to sustain and protect its territorial integration, especially regarding China’s Nine-Dash Line claim that has provoked conflict with East Asian and Southeast Asian states.

Highlighting this issue from the jurisdiction and international law aspect, Aristyo stated that the CCG law is essentially illegal. The CCG law is highly problematic from the jurisdiction side because it would violate other states’ sovereignty, which is legally guaranteed under international law. In addition to that, China’s Nine-Dash line claim would make any territory under the claim illegal. The new law that would allow the CCG’s use of force against parties deemed to interfere in China’s jurisdiction and maritime sovereignty violates international law that forbids any activity in a disputed territory. Not only that, the new CCG law explicitly violates several international laws and treaties, namely the UNCLOS and the UN Charter. Through its new CCG law, China has violated international instruments that forbid states to employ their military capability in resolving maritime disputes.

Moreover, Aristyo explained the new CCG law’s escalation impact; it would increase tensions between China and its bordering countries. China’s Nine-Dash Line claim has pushed itself into being stuck in several maritime disputes with East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. So far, China shows no hesitation in employing coercive means and threatening these countries, even though there is an ongoing effort to negotiate a Code of Conduct (CoC). The new CCG bill’s authorisation will have sour implications towards the CoC negotiation process, sending a message that Beijing does not take the negotiations seriously. Tensions will escalate not only with states who are directly involved in this dispute, but also with the US—noting that the US also plays a role in this maritime territorial dispute.

At the end of his presentation, Aristyo stated that several international actors could take several actions in regards to China passing the new CCG Law. According to him, other claimant countries or countries concerned with the South China Sea dispute could have shown a more robust response. In this case, the response can be in the form of condemnation or pressure against China to quickly evoke or amend the law. In terms of Indonesia, Aristyo claimed that the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had invited the Chinese Ambassador for talks, but the invitation was left unanswered. Aristyo suggested that it is time for Indonesia to send a diplomatic note to Beijing to show a concrete effort of Indonesia’s commitment to ensuring peace in the Southeast Asian region. Nevertheless, he also stresses that Indonesia must be prepared for all possibilities, especially because Indonesian maritime resources are far behind China’s.

Writer : Brigitta Kalina

Editor : Mariola Yansverio

[RECAP] Beyond the Great Wall #13: Cina dan Kedaulatan Maritim

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Jumat (26/02), Institute of International Studies UGM menyelenggarakan forum “Beyond the Great Wall” edisi ke-13 yang bertajuk “Cina dan Kedaulatan Maritim”. Forum diselanggarakan secara daring melalui media Zoom Meetings. Pada forum kali ini, BTGW menghadirkan Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, dosen dan peneliti Center for Sustainable Ocean Policy, Fakultas Hukum Indonesia. Aristyo membawakan materi dengan judul “China’s New Coast Guard Law: Illegal and Escalatory.” Tidak hanya itu, BTGW #13 juga menghadirkan Nur Rachmat Yuliantoro, Dosen Ilmu Hubungan Internasional UGM, sebagai moderator.

Pada Februari lalu, Cina telah mengesahkan China’s New Coast Guard Law, sebuah undang-undang yang mengizinkan China’s Coast Guard (CCG) untuk mengerahkan segala kemampuan (termasuk penggunaan senjata) kepada pihak yang dianggap mengganggu kedaulatan dan yurisdiksi kemaritiman Cina. Berangkat dari hal tersebut, melalui materi yang disampaikannya, Aristyo menyatakan bahwa undang-undang ini sejatinya melanggar hukum internasional, dan justru akan mengekskalasi konflik diantara negara-negara yang berbatasan laut dengan Cina. Di awal pemaparannya, Aristyo menjelaskan bahwa CCG memiliki sejarah panjang dalam perkembangannya. Sejak tahun 2013, CCG Bureau dibentuk untuk menyatukan badan-badan hukum maritim yang dibentuk oleh Cina dengan sebutan “Five Dragons” yang meliputi China Marine Surveillance, Chinese Coast Guard, Chinese Maritime Patrol, China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, dan General Administration of Customs. Upaya ini tentunya dilakukan sebagai bagian dari ambisi Cina untuk mempertahakan integrasi wilayahnya, utamanya terkait dengan klaim Nine-Dash Line yang telah memicu terjadinya konflik dengan negara-negara di Asia Timur maupun Asia Tenggara.

Aristyo menyatakan bahwa hukum CCG sejatinya ilegal. Dari yurisdiksinya, hukum CCG sangat problematis karena pengesahan hukum CCG berarti akan melanggar kedaulatan negara lain, yang memiliki klaim wilayah yang legal di mata hukum intenasional. Selain itu, klaim Nine-Dash Line Cina menjadikan wilayah yang terletak di bawah klaim tersebut menjadi ilegal. Hukum baru yang membolehkan CCG untuk mengerahkan senjata dan melakukan berbagai upaya kepada pihak yang dianggap melanggar kedaulatan dan yurisdiksi Cina secara jelas telah melanggar ketentuan hukum internasional yang melarang berbagai bentuk kegiatan di wilayah yang masih disengketakan. Tidak hanya itu, hukum baru CCG juga secara jelas melanggar berbagai hukum dan perjanjian internasional seperti UNCLOS dan Piagam PBB. Instrumen-instrumen tersebut melarang berbagai negara untuk menggunakan kapasitas militernya dalam menyelesaikan sengketa laut menjadi poin yang jelas-jelas dilanggar oleh Cina melalui hukum baru CCG.

Selanjutnya, Aristyo juga menjelaskan bahwa pada dasarnya hukum baru CCG justru akan mengeskalasi tensi antara Cina dan negara-negara yang berbatasan laut dengannya. Selama ini, klaim Nine-Dash Line Cina telah membuatnya tersangkut dalam berbagai sengketa maritim dengan negara-negara di Asia Tenggara dan Asia Timur. Cina bahkan tidak segan-segan menggunakan upaya-upaya yang koersif dan mengancam negara-negara tersebut kendati upaya negosiasi Code of Conduct (CoC) sedang berlangsung. Pengesahan hukum baru CCG justru akan memperburuk proses negosiasi CoC yang sedang diupayakan dan menunjukkan bahwa Beijing tidak serius dalam upaya negosiasi CoC. Tidak hanya itu, pengesahan hukum baru CCG juga akan meningkatkan tensi yang telah terjadi antara Cina dan Amerika Serikat (AS), mengingat hadirnya AS di wilayah yang berkonflik dengan Cina.

Di ujung presentasinya, Aristyo menyatakan bahwa ada beberapa hal yang mestinya mampu dilakukan oleh berbagai aktor internasional terkait disahkannya hukum baru CCG. Menurutnya, negara-negara yang mengklaim dan berkepentingan dalam isu Laut Cina Selatan seharusnya mampu merespon dengan lebih kuat. Respon ini dapat berupa kecaman dan tekanan kepada Cina untuk segera merubah ataupun meniadakan undang-undang ini. Selain itu, berbicara secara spesifik mengenai Indonesia, Aristyo mengklaim bahwa sebenarnya pemerintah Indonesia melalui Kementerian Luar Negeri telah melakukan panggilan kepada Duta Besar Cina di Indonesia. Namun, tidak mendapatkan jawaban. Baginya, sudah saatnya bagi Indonesia untuk mengirimkan nota diplomatik kepada Beijing sebagai bentuk nyata komitmen Indonesia untuk menjaga perdamaian di wilayah Asia Tenggara. Walaupun begitu, ia juga menggarisbawahi bahwa Indonesia harus bersiap atas segala kemungkinan yang terjadi mengingat sumber daya dan kapabilitas maritim Indonesia masih sangat jauh dibawah Cina.

Penulis : Brigitta Kalina

Editor : Mariola Yansverio

[RECAP] Cangkir Teh #1 : “Membela Demokrasi di Tengah Pandemi — Refleksi Perlawanan Nirkekerasan di Indonesia dan Dunia 2020”

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Edisi perdana Cangkir Teh pada tahun 2021 telah diselenggarakan pada hari Senin 22 Februari 2021, dan merupakan hasil kerjsama Institute of International Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada (IIS UGM) dengan Tim Damai Pangkal Damai (DPD). Agenda utama pertemuan Cangkir Teh kali ini, adalah untuk mendiskusikan dan membedah laporan “Membela Demokrasi di Tengah Pandemi — Refleksi Perlawanan Nirkekerasan di Indonesia dan Dunia 2020”. Pada edisi kali ini, IIS UGM mengundang 3 pembicara, yaitu Diah Kusumaningrum, Dosen Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Universitas Gadjah Mada dan peneliti IIS UGM, Ihsan Ali Fauzi, perwakilan dari Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi (PUSAD) Paramadina, dan Puri Kencana Putri, perwakilan Accenture Malaysia dan mantan wartawan KontraS. Sesi ini dimoderatori oleh Cut Intan Aulianisa Isma, Manajer IIS UGM

Diah membuka sesi dengan membahas mengenai latar belakang dari Tim Damai Pangkal Damai, yang merupakan proyek database aksi nirkekerasan di Indonesia pada era reformasi. Bekerjasama dengan mahasiswa-mahasiswa yang berdedikasi, Tim DPD telah berhasil mencatat 14.023 aksi nirkekerasan di Indonesia pada era reformasi.  Database tersebut diharapkan dapat membantu pihak-pihak yang membutuhkan untuk menyelenggarakan aksi-aksi damai, mulai dari mahasiswa, masyarakat adat, hingga jurnalis yang dapat mempelajari jurnalisme damai. Diah juga berharap, bahwa pemerintah dan aparat juga dapat mempelajari prinsip-prinsip nirkekerasan, dan menerapkan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari di Indonesia, dan memperkuat struktur demokrasi yang telah ada. Tim DPD percaya, bahwa kultur yang paling penting dalam demokrasi adalah kontestasi dengan menerapkan prinsip-prinsip nirkekerasan.

Sesi dilanjutkan dengan pembahasan mengenai isi dari laporan “Membela Demokrasi di Tengah Pandemi — Refleksi Perlawanan Nirkekerasan di Indonesia dan Dunia 2020” diharapkan dapat menjadi dokumen yang dapat digunakan untuk menjadi refleksi dari aksi-aksi nirkekerasan yang telah diterapkan di Indonesia pada era Reformasi, dan diluncurkan bertepatan dengan World Day of Social Justice. Laporan ini dibagi menjadi beberapa bagian, dan dimulai dengan executive summary. Diah memaparkan bahwa tahun 2020 juga ditandai oleh mulai digunakannya secara meluas aksi-aksi nirkekerasan pada berbagai macam gerakan diseluruh dunia, mulai dari Indonesia, Amerika, Tunisia, Hong Kong, dan lain lain, dan dapat dikategorikan kedalam 198 metode aksi nirkekerasan ala Gene Sharp. Pandemi tidak membuat aksi-aksi nirkekerasan diseluruh dunia berakhir, dan justru membuat aksi nirkekerasan jauh lebih penting dibandingkan sebelumnya.

Pandemi membuat aksi nirkekerasan terus berjalan, dan justru memperkenalkan aktor-aktor baru dalam aksi nirkekerasan, seperti penggemar KPop, Ibu-ibu kulit putih kelas menengah di Amerika hingga veteran perang. Selain itu, intensitas aksi di berbagai tempat juga meningkat, dan menjadi obyek solidaritas dan pembelajaran transnasional. Namun, di sisi lain aksi-aksi nirkekerasan justru disalah gunakan oleh gerakan sayap kanan seperti gerakan anti vaksin dan anti masker, hingga gerakan supremasi kulit putih, dan juga dapat disambut dengan represi oleh negara dimana aksi tersebut berlangsung. Sebagai penutup, Diah merekomendasikan untuk mewajarkan aksi nirkekerasan sebagai bagian dari kultur demokrasi, dan tidak perlu dihadapi dengan represi.

Sesi dilanjutkan oleh Ihsan yang menyampaikan apresiasinya bahwa database DPD sangatlah penting dalam mendukung studi-studi nirkekerasan di Indonesia, dan merupakan sebuah output yang baik dari kampus. Ihsan mendukung pelibatan Mahasiswa dalam kegiatan riset seperti yang telah dilakukan oleh DPD, dan berharap kampus-kampus di Indonesia dapat menggunakan database aksi nirkekerasan tersebut. Namun, Ihsan juga memaparkan beberapa tantangan yang harus dihadapi oleh tim DPD kedepannya, mulai dari keberlanjutan, hingga kerjasama media, dimana database tim DPD sejauh ini baru dibuat dengan 1 media (KOMPAS) sebagai sumber data. Mungkin untuk kedepannya, Ihsan berharap tim DPD dan IIS dapat memilih alternatif sumber lain selain kompas.

Terakhir, Ihsan menyampaikan sedikit kekhawatirannya atas perubahan dasar aksi nirkekerasan dari luring menjadi daring. Ihsan menekankan, bahwa ada kemungkinan bahwa actor-aktor lama yang sebelumnya aktif dalam gerakan nirkekerasan justru menjadi pasif setelah terjadinya pandemi dan represi rezim. Apakah pemain-pemain baru dalam gerakan nirkekerasan daring menghentikan partisipasi pemain pemain lama? Apakah aktivisme daring yang berdasarkan klik kemudian partisipasi selesai? Bagaimana civil society menghadapi sumber daya daring yang dimiliki oleh negara seperti buzzer dan influencer? Terakhir, Ihsan juga menekankan bahwa laporan juga perlu mencatat mengenai kekalahan-kekalahan aksi nirkekerasan yang terjadi.

Sebagai narasumber terakhir, Puri turut menyampaikan apresiasinya terhadap hasil kerja dari tim DPD, dan berharap bahwa output dari tim DPD dapat digunakan secara luas oleh berbagai pihak. Puri juga memaparkan materinya yang berjudul “Otoritarianisme Digital” sebagai saran untuk tim DPD dalam menjalankan penelitian untuk kedepannya. Otoritarianisme digital menjadi lebih marak setelah terjadinya pandemi, dan ditandai dengan Kerjasama otoritas pemerintahan dengan gerakan-gerakan sayap kanan yang melaksanakan kampanye-kampanye yang bertentangan dan suara-suara masyarakat sipil dan secara tidak langsung menghalangi terjadinya kritik-kritik tegas terhadap pemerintah. Lebih jauh lagi, dalam kasus yang terjadi di Amerika Serikat, otoritas negara juga menjalankan praktik-praktik digital buruk lain seperti espionase, surveillance, hingga intervensi pemilu. Pada praktiknya, otoritarianisme digital yang dilakukan oleh negara mengancam kebebasan berekspresi masyarakat sipil dalam ranah digital.

Sesi ditutup dengan sesi diskusi yang melibatkan para pembicara dengan seluruh peserta diskusi Cangkir Teh, yang berjalan dengan cukup kondusif.

Penulis : Raditya Bomantara

Penyunting : Mariola Yansverio

[RECAP] Cangkir Teh #1 : : “Defending Democracy Amidst a Pandemic–Nonviolent resistance in Indonesia and the World 2020.”

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The first Cangkir Teh discussion was held on Monday, February 22nd 2021. The discussion was a collaborative effort between the Institute of International Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada (IIS UGM) and Damai Pangkal Damai Team (DPD). This forum’s main agenda is to discuss and dissect the “Defending Democracy Amidst a Pandemic–Nonviolent resistance in Indonesia and the World 2020” report. On this occasion, IIS invited three speakers, which are: Diah Kusumaningrum, International Relations Professor at Universitas Gadjah Mada and researcher at IIS UGM, Ihsan Ali Fauzi, representative of Centre for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD) Paramadina, and Puri Kencana Putri, representative of Accenture Malaysia and ex-journalist for KontraS. This session was moderated by Cut Intan Auliannisa Isma, Manager of IIS UGM.

Diah started the discussion by explaining the background of the Damai Pangkal Damai initiative, a project aiming to create a database of nonviolent actions in Indonesia during the Reform era. The team, also involving students’ role, has successfully compiled 14.023 nonviolent actions in Indonesia during the reform era. It is hoped that the database would assist actors who are willing to involve themselves in nonviolent actions, including students, indigenous communities, or even journalists who are eager to learn about peaceful journalism. Additionally, Diah also hopes that the government and the police would learn nonviolent principles and implement those in daily life whilst also strengthening democracy in Indonesia. The DPD team believes that the most crucial culture in democracy is conducting contestations whilst implementing nonviolent principles.

The session is then continued by discussing the report’s content. It is hoped that the report would act as a document that can be used in reflecting and learning about nonviolent actions in Indonesia during the Reform era, as it was launched on World Day of Social Justice. The report is divided into several essential parts, starting with an executive summary. Diah stated that in 2020, nonviolent methods of actions were widely adopted in various movements around the world, starting from Indonesia, the US, Tunisia, Hong Kong, and many others–all of which can be categorized in Gene SHarp’s 198 methods of nonviolent action. This proved that the pandemic does not end the mobilization of nonviolent actions in the world; instead, it makes nonviolent action increasingly more important than before.

The COVID-19 pandemic does not diminish the mobilization of nonviolent actions. Instead, it introduces new actors in nonviolent action, such as KPop fans, middle-class white American women, and even war veterans. Other than that, the intensity of actions in various places are also increasing, and they become objects of solidarity and transnational learning. Unfortunately, in some cases, nonviolent actions are often appropriated by right-wing movements, such as anti-mask and anti-vaccine protests and even white supremacist campaigns. It is also regrettable how in many cases, nonviolent actions also receive repression from the state. In her closing statement, Diah advocates for the normalization of nonviolent actions as a part of democratic culture and it should not be met with repression.

Furthermore, the second speaker continued the session, Ihsan, who articulated his appreciation towards the DPD database. Ihsan stated that the database supports nonviolent studies in Indonesia and is a significant and great output from campus. Ihsan also supports students’ involvement in the research process, and he hopes that other universities in Indonesia would use the database. However, Ihsan also expressed a few challenges that the DPD team will face in the future, including continuity and media partnership. So far, the database has only been used by one media (KOMPAS) as a data resource. Ihsan hopes that the DPD team and IIS could pick an alternative partner other than Kompas in the future.

Lastly, Ihsan expressed his concerns about the shifting of the arena from offline to online. Ihsan emphasized that there is a possibility that those who previously actively participated in nonviolent actions have become disengaged because of the pandemic and state repression. Are the new players in online nonviolent actions stop the participation of previous players? Do the participation of online activists stop at clicking their gadgets, or do they go beyond that? How does civil society respond to the online presence of the state through buzzers and influencers? Lastly, Ihsan also stresses that the report also needs to write about the defeat that nonviolent actions experience.

As the last speaker, Putri also expressed her appreciation for the work the DPD team does, she also hopes that many actors in the society could widely use the output of the DPD team. Besides, Putri presented her materials, titled “Digital Authoritarianism” or “Otoritarianisme Digital”, as an input for the DPD team in conducting their future research. Digital authoritarianism becomes more apparent during the pandemic, marked by the government’s collaboration with right-wing movements. Those right-wing groups often involve themselves in advocating voices that are not in line with civil society’s voices; their involvement also indirectly hinders criticism against the government. Furthermore, cases in the US show that the state also involves espionage, digital surveillance, and even intervention in elections. In practice, the state’s digital authoritarianism threatens freedom of expression in the digital sphere.

The forum is closed with a discussion session that involves both the speakers and the participants, which went very well.

Writer : Raditya Bomantara

Editor : Mariola Yansverio

Sistem Senjata Otonom Mematikan : Sebuah Acuan Dasar Untuk Kajian Dan Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia

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Klik tautan berikut untuk mengunduh file Sistem Senjata Otonom Mematikan : Sebuah Acuan Dasar Untuk Kajian Dan Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia [tersedia dalam versi Bahasa Indonesia dan versi Bahasa Inggris] :

http://bit.ly/PrimerKillerRobots

It’s Time to Rethink Jakarta’s Water Governance

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As if the COVID-19 crisis is not enough, Jakarta is now also facing another flood catastrophe. Most recently, flooding affected around 200 neighborhood units (RT) and forced more than 1,000 people to evacuate their homes.

Indonesia is currently facing a series of disasters including floods, landslides, whirlwinds and extreme droughts in some parts of the country. According to the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB), the number of disasters has nearly tripled in the past five years from around 1,664 in 2015 to 3,023 in 2020.

Of course the usual culprit of these disasters is climate change, which according to Prof. Edvin Aldrian of the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) is caused by environmental changes and degradation within and without the country.

While it is not untrue, there is more than meets the eye: it is the failure of urban water planning and governance which has contributed to Jakarta’s persistent flooding. Overlooking the root causes will not only undermine the deeper issue, but also shift the attention to quick and temporary technological fixes that only exacerbate the environmental catastrophe.

The flooding in Jakarta this year was timely as Vox, a US media outlet, published a video report on Jakarta’s environmental crisis, which has caused the city to sink as fast as 25 centimeters annually. The report associates this crisis with Dutch-inherited segregated water infrastructure, massive groundwater exploitation and rapid urban development leading to a proliferation of concrete that prevents rainwater from replenishing water lost from the city’s aquifer layers.

These issues, however, cannot be solved with simple technological fixes. Rather they require a rearrangement of water governance that has proven to have failed to provide equal and sustainable access to the city’s population.

This failure is evident in three aspects: the exclusion of the urban poor from the governance process, the blurry lines between rights and responsibilities of the stakeholders, and the elite-centric decision-making process.

In an effort to do so, we can start by rethinking our water governance approach that currently focuses on the centralized water infrastructure to also incorporate a variety of everyday water practices. These have been chosen by people either because they are excluded from the network or because their access is limited due to the weak water pressure, or the unreliable and low-quality supply of the available network.

The reality of water governance in Jakarta is not reflected in the networked infrastructure that only covers 65 percent of the population with the majority of customers coming from middle to lower income households. Considering service unreliability that is not consistent with constant tariff increases, even those who are connected also fulfill their water needs either from groundwater, rainwater harvesting or bottled water.

According to the report from Amrta Institute, more than 60 percent of the city’s water needs are fulfilled by groundwater, which serves nearly two-thirds of the city’s water consumption, or around 630 million cubic metre out of 1 billion m3/year.

Unfortunately, the discussion on Jakarta’s water governance has been biased toward the centralized infrastructure, which is problematic for three main reasons. First, it reinforces a legacy of the colonial government water development planning, which is socially and geographically fragmented. This has inherently prevented the urban poor, especially those who live in informal settlements, from both accessing the piped water infrastructure and participating in the governance process.

Second, centralized piped water infrastructure is often used as a justification for private sector participation due the government’s lack of capacity to fund capital costs. However, as evident in Jakarta, neither public nor private operators have successfully ensured adequate and sustainable water service provision for the population, even those who adhere to pro-poor initiatives.

Lastly, the focus on centralized infrastructure promotes the development of big-infrastructural projects as a band-aid for the environmental catastrophe while neglecting the underlying issue of water governance failure. For example, the construction of a USD$40 billion giant sea wall to prevent seawater from overflowing into the already sinking city does not address the underlying problems and often comes at a cost of forced eviction of many informal settlements which burdens the already excluded urban poor.

Thus, there is a need to look beyond the networked water infrastructure by considering everyday water practices in which people interact within and outside the centralized infrastructure. Such practices include buying water from neighbors, collecting water from public stand-pipes, purchasing from pushcart vendors and extracting groundwater from shallow or deep wells.

Looking at these everyday practices will allow us to unveil the different manifestations of water inequalities in terms of distribution, recognition and participation. For example, research by Kooy and Furlong in 2018 found that over-abstraction of groundwater in rich neighborhoods has led to salinization of shallow groundwater and land-subsidence in poor neighborhoods, exposing the urban poor to higher risk of flooding and poorer water quality.

Equally important, paying attention to everyday water practices will not only allow us to understand the different manifestations of urban water inequality but also enable us to capture local knowledge and practices that have been filling the gap left by the centralized water infrastructure. This will counter the disempowering image of the urban poor as a passive recipient or victim of Jakarta’s unequal water governance.

This article does not seek to diminish the importance of centralized piped water infrastructure or the urgency for people to be connected to a piped water source, instead it seeks to highlight the need to look beyond the centralized network in order to develop a more holistic understanding of Jakarta’s water governance.

Hopefully, this will lead to the creation of an inclusive and sustainable urban water governance that allows for more equitable access to water, increasing recognition and larger space for participation especially for marginalized communities including the poor in informal settlements, women, migrants and the disabled.

 

This article has been published by the Jakarta Post and can also be accessed via the following link: https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2021/02/26/its-time-to-rethink-jakartas-water-governance.html

Writer : Marwa

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

The Striking Generational Divide, Explained

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Generational “finger-pointing” is not a novel concept and has existed for centuries within multitude of generations, each blaming the other for issues and ideas neither generation wants to take accountability for.  Both Gen Y (people born between the years 1980-1994) and Gen Z (people born between the years 1995-2010) have formed an alliance to push back on the older generations, specifically the Baby Boomers. A clash of ideas and a point of difference of views on society has struck tension between generations, preventing a progressive society from fully forming.

The younger generation is racially diverse, environmentally and socially conscious, and have a clear vision for how they want their future to unfold (Valencia-Garcia 2020). However, it is apparent that the ideas of the younger generations contrast sharply with older generations, who tend to reject policy reforms or ideas presented by the youth. A difference in “expectations of the future, ethics and politics” (Birnstengel 2019) has formed a generational split and prevents society from progressing entirely. The generational divide is not only based on family morals and ethics but is also an accumulation of different people living fundamentally different lives and experiencing different circumstances in general. Technology and politics are two key factors that have continually evolved through generations and have influenced generation’s perspective on society deeply (Birnstengel 2019).

Today, the debate on generationalism is centered around how a nation should look and exactly what kinds of people should be a part of that nation. Millennials and Gen Z have been defined by the rise of the internet and identity politics. They grew up with the internet, but also remember a life in analogue (Frey 2020). They have experienced economic crises and watched the War on Terror unfold, and as a result are concerned for their futures due to the large influence capitalist and traditionalist institutions still have on society (Valencia-Garcia 2020). Older generations are wanting to protect these outdated institutions that uphold their own old-fashioned values in order to push their agendas on the nation. Pew Research centre research found that the upcoming younger generation was the most ethically and racially diverse generation to date, fundamentally driving their progressive attitudes (Birnstengel 2019).

A distinct issue that has caused great generational divide is the climate crisis. Younger people across the world have grown up with more exposure to the effects of climate change than the older generations (Cohen 2019). Thus, young adults in current day are of higher concern about climate change as they understand the implications better and are more educated on the topic. The attitudes of younger generations and their beliefs has pushed an agenda to resolve the climate crisis dramatically, creating very real social change that is being reflected in policy changes around the world (Cohen 2019). Although the impacts of climate change are ever present and should be dealt with immediately, the push for policy change around the environment is a reflection of the youth’s priorities for society. Along with climate change, issues such as racial justice and social inclusivity are other examples of younger generations pushing important issues.

Older generations accuse younger generations of naivety and younger generations don’t understand their parochialism. Potentially, a middle ground could be met where older generations feel their needs are being fulfilled while society continues to progress as a whole. However, generational gaps will continue to arise if unity is not formed or perceptions do not alter to accommodate for one another

 

REFERENCES:

Birnstengel, G 2019, Boomer Blaming, Finger Pointing and The Generational Divide, Forbes, retrieved February 2 2021

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Writer : Emily Camilleri

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

Military Coup 2021 and the Stalemate of Democratization Process in Myanmar

/in , /by

The dream of becoming a fully democratic country is perhaps still a long way off for people in Myanmar. A coup or a seizure of power by the military has occurred, marking a sign of stalemate in the democratization process in Myanmar for the last decade. On February 1st, 2021, local news outlets and various international media reported that Aung San Suu Kyi as the state counselor and Myanmar’s de facto leader had been detained by the Myanmar military (Regan, Olarn, and Westcott, 2021). Not only Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, the leader of the government, and several other government officials have also been detained. In addition, the military also declared a state of emergency and took over power for at least the next year (DW, 2021).

 The military claims that the arrests are related to an alleged fraud in November 2020 election. In the election, The National League for Democracy, a political party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a significant victory by obtaining 396 out of 476 seats in the combined lower and upper houses of Parliament. This victory is certainly a threat in itself, at least in terms military’s guaranteed 25% parliamentary seats (Shine OO, 2021).  Although currently the conflict is still limited to the elite level, the impact of this struggle for power has begun to  spread towards citizen of Myanmar with the broadcast disruptions of the Myanmar National TV station and Myanmar National Radio. It was also reported that there was internet network disruption in the capital Yangon on Tuesday morning with network connections dropping by 75 percent (DW, 2021).

The democratic crisis that occurred in Myanmar received strong reactions from various international actors. The United States threatened to take action and ensure that Myanmar’s military would get consequences if they did not comply with democratic principles. UN Secretary General Antonio Gutieress also criticized the incident, saying that it was a serious blow for Myanmar democracy. Various criticisms have also come from international humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that have been calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and denounced access to communications and internet networks (Al Jazeera, 2021).

Myanmar’s Pseudo Democratization Process

This recent event is certainly a major stumbling block for the struggle towards democracy in Myanmar. Optimism for the creation of a democratic civilian government must now be confronted with the existence of the military which has again shown its influence in Myanmar’s political struggle of power. Whereas, after the political reforms carried out by President U Thein Sein which was marked by changing the mode of government from a total military junta to a hybrid civil-military administration in 2011, optimism for the new face of democracy in Myanmar was getting bigger, both domestically and internationally. With various concessions granted in 2011 including commitment to democratic elections and loosening media control, political spaces that have been controlled by the military were becoming an open contestation for civilians to take part in politics. The peak was in 2015 when the National League of Democracy won the election with a significant number of votes. As a result, the NLD effectively took state legislative power from the military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and officially granted the reins of executive power to civilians (Ko, 2018).

Although it appears that there has been a marked development in the democratic process after the election of civilian leaders through democratic elections in 2015, the reality is that the democratic process in Myanmar is far from being successful and completed. It even tends to appear as pseudo democratization. The point of pseudo-democratization here is that although on the surface there was a power transition from military to civilian, there has never been any attempt to reduce military power either in any level of the government. In the 2008 constitution, which is still in effect today, for example, the military is automatically guaranteed to get 25 percent of seats in the Myanmar parliament. The same constitution also states that every legislative decision must get at least 75 percent of the members of the Myanmar parliament. With the automatic allotment of 25 percent of seats for the military, it means that all forms of Myanmar legislative decisions must be approved by the Military faction in parliament to fulfil the minimum requirement of 75 percent, and the Military has the opportunity to veto all decisions discussed in the legislative process (Miclat, 2020). Moreover, the 2008 constitution also gives the Military control to key ministries such as the ministry of defense, the ministry of border affairs, and the ministry of home affairs (Turner, 2011). In addition, the military still has a strong influence on Myanmar’s bureaucracy where 90 percent of public officials and 80 percent of ambassadors are ex-military personnel, so that a more democratic political climate will be difficult to create (Ko, 2018).

To further understand the democratization process in Myanmar, we must also look at the history of the political reforms that took place in 2011. Although during that period President Thein Sein received a lot of praise from international community for his decision to encourage political liberalization that has reduced repression and created avenues for civil participation in the institutions, the main motive of the reforms is still being debated. As summarized by Bunte and Dosch (2015), political scientists see that political reform carried out by Myanmar was a “survival strategy of the quasi-military government” to overcome the danger of factionalism and to increase regime durability by creating power-sharing institutions. Several other political scientists said that this strategy was a military effort to increase Myanmar’s legitimacy in the international world as well as to improve Myanmar’s worrying socio-political conditions with international sanctions and the post-Cyclone Nargis recovery conditions that ravaged the country in 2008 (Bunte and Dosch, 2015).

By looking from the history of the democratization process in Myanmar especially related to the 2011 event, we can conclude that in fact this political reform is the result of generosity from the previous military government, therefore it is very likely that one day the military government will take back the “gift” if something does not go according to their expectations. Moreover, the bureaucratic climate in fact, which is still controlled by many military elements, will certainly make it easier for the military to mobilize its strength to take over power in the future. In contrast to other countries, for example, such as Indonesia, which demilitarized post-reform political elements in 1998 by eliminating military dual function, efforts to reduce military influence in Myanmar politics were minimal, as evidenced by the persistence of the tight military control on the aspects of Myanmar’s political life both in the legislative sector with a 25 percent military quota in parliament, as well as the quota of three important ministries in the executive sphere, namely the Ministry of Defense which has authority over Myanmar Armed Forces, Ministry of Border Affairs which controls border affairs of the country, the Ministry of Home Affairs which is in charge of administrative affairs and control of the police, narrows the space for civil society in political affairs in the country so that their resistance to political crises such as a coup became very vulnerable (Prameswaran, 2020).

From this event we can see that this military coup is an attempt by the Myanmar military to take back what they consider to be their right – full power and influence in all aspects of the life of the Myanmar people – as well as preventing the possibility of developing an external power that can rival their existence. The NLD’s landslide victory in the Myanmar elections, as well as the decline in the votes obtained by the USDP as the party backed by the military (The Irrawady, 2020), certainly is a big enough blow to the military’s existence so that they must take certain steps to maintain their power by carrying out a forced takeover of power and alleging that election fraud has occurred.

For Myanmar’s civil society, they do not have much choice but to wait for the situation to subside and hope that political stability in their country can be quickly upheld. The absence of Aung San Suu Kyi and several other civilian political figures who were detained by the military would have been a major blow to the struggle of civil society because so far they have relied on Aung San Suu Kyi as a political mouthpiece for the majority of Myanmar civil society. The strong control in every aspect of society as well as the fear of persecution, intimidation, and the silencing of freedom of speech which was marked by the shutdown of television, radio and internet broadcasts in Myanmar became an obstacle to civil society’s resistance efforts to the political crisis that was happening on their homeland.

What Myanmar Coup 2021 means for the international community?

With the limited number of actions that civil society groups can take in Myanmar, there are currently great hopes placed on the international community to be able to take certain steps to save the democratic process in that country. Criticism has already been made, but of course this will not be enough without being accompanied by firm steps that will put great pressure on the existence of military forces in Myanmar.

The biggest challenge faced by the United States as a country that has been committed to promoting and ensuring the smooth running of the democratization process around the world. Moreover, this event is the first challenge for the new government under President Joe Biden who was appointed at the beginning of the year. After the resignation of Donald Trump, who tends to have an inward looking policy, the United States is currently required to show its hegemony as a leading country, especially in the democratization process which has been their commitment. But of course these steps will not be that easy. In Myanmar’s affairs, America must face China, which has a big interest in the country, especially in the economic sector related to oil and natural gas. In contrast to the United States, which immediately gave a strong reaction, China prefers to be more careful in responding to this case while calling on the warring parties to resolve the political crisis with a peaceful manner (Wintour, 2021).

ASEAN as a regional organization and the countries that are members of it, especially Brunei Darussalam, which has just been entrusted with the ASEAN Chairmanship starting January 1, 2021 also faced the challenge of being able to help resolve this political crisis. Even though there is the principle of non-interference that must be upheld, however, ASEAN countries must be able to play an active role in efforts to prevent potential conflicts. For example, ASEAN as an organization as well as certain ASEAN countries must be able to encourage and facilitate peaceful discussions between conflicting parties if needed. In this case ASEAN is required to be able to create a just, democratic, harmonious and gender-sensitive environment in accordance with the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law in accordance with ASEAN Vision 2025. But this will not be an easy thing for ASEAN. In fact, shortly after the event there were various reactions from its member countries. Brunei as chairman of ASEAN, followed by various countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore through an official statement, has raised their concern and urged that this issue can be resolved peacefully in accordance with applicable legal principles. Even so, several countries including Cambodia and Thailand chose not to comment further and considered that this matter was an internal Myanmar affair and they considered that they had no right to interfere either in the ASEAN framework or in the bilateral framework. It will be difficult for ASEAN to think of a multilateral framework that can help resolve this crisis if its members are not in one voice in responding to this issue.

Historically, pressure from the international community has proven to be able to push for policy reforms that are considered de facto starting the democratization process in Myanmar in 2011. In the current  situation, when the people of Myanmar are again facing a political crisis caused by the excessive display of political power from the military, the role of the international community in giving pressure to the military action in Myanmar will be crucial in ensuring the political stability and the sustainability of the democratization process in Myanmar.

 

References

 

Al Jazeera. (2021). ‘Serious Blow to Democracy’: World Condemns Myanmar Military Coup. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/1/world-reacts-to-military-coup-in-myanmar

Bünte, M., & Dosch, J. (2015). Myanmar: Political Reforms and the Recalibration of External Relations. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 34(2), 3-19.

Channel News Asia. (2021). ASEAN Chair Brunei Calls for ‘Dialogue, Reconciliation and Return to Normalcy’ in Myanmar. Retrieved from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-asean-aung-san-suu-kyi-military-coup-14087150

Deutsche Welle. (2021). Myanmar Coup: Aung San Suu Kyi Detained as Military Seizes Power. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-coup-aung-san-suu-kyi-detained-as-military-seizes-power/a-56400678

Helen Regan, Kocha Olarn, & Westcott, B. (2021). Myanmar’s Military Seizes Power in Coup after Detaining Leader Aung San Suu Kyi and Ruling Party Politicians. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/31/world/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-detained-intl/index.html

Irrawaddy, T. (2020). Myanmar’s 2020 General Election Results in Numbers. Election 2020. Retrieved from https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/myanmars-2020-general-election-results-numbers.html?fbclid=IwAR0uo7ZdreRaaGyiJ-nnXdvJqbhgYcD-pTOcT0KKGqTQerFoBHiNHwFOexk

Ko, A. K. (2018). Democratisation in Myanmar: Glue or Gloss? Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3d07eb88-d4f1-de81-40d1-032ec67a3cb8&groupId=288143

Miclat, G. (2020). Challenges to Democracy and Hopes for Peace and Justice in Myanmar. The Debate. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/challenges-to-democracy-and-hopes-for-peace-and-justice-in-myanmar/

Oo, A. S. (2021). Myanmar Military Denies Coup Threats over Vote Fraud Claims. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/constitutions-myanmar-elections-asia-min-aung-hlaing-1d8af462424d818f96e88dc6ed115dc1

Parameswaran, P. (2020). What Will Myanmar’s New Home Minister Mean for the Country’s Security and Politics? ASEAN Beat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/what-will-myanmars-new-home-minister-mean-for-the-countrys-security-and-politics/

Turnell, S. (2012). Myanmar in 2011: Confounding Expectations. Asian Survey, 52(1), 157-164.

Wintour, P. (2021). Myanmar Coup: US and China Divided in Response to Army Takeover. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/01/myanmar-coup-us-and-china-divided-in-response-to-army-takeover-aung-san-suu-kyi

Writer : Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti