RCEP: Peril or Impetus for a Greater ASEAN Regionalism?

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Against the backdrop of global pandemic, ASEAN successfully held its 37th summit from 12-15 November 2020. During the four days course of the conference, ASEAN members mainly discussed multilateral cooperation to recover from pandemic and the tension that was escalating in the region, notably in the South China Sea months prior to the conference. In the midst of rising tension, ASEAN reaches a historic milestone with the signing of Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement/RCEP. The trade agreement unites ten ASEAN member states, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia under the same flagship—countries that previously cooperated under ASEAN +6 excluding India.

The trade pact that comprises of 15 countries across Asia-Pacific and covers almost a third of the world population is regarded as the world’s biggest trade agreement, next after the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement and European Union. Other than the sheer number of the countries participating in this agreement, the mega-regional agreement also demonstrates the feats of bridging three East Asian countries—China, Japan, and South Korea that are traditionally reluctant to engage under the same economic framework—with its counterparts in Western Pacific. The agreement is expected to progressively cut down the already low tariff among member countries and incentivize investment flow when it finally comes into effect (Lee, 2020). Vietnam, a country that has been profoundly affected by rivalry between the United States and China in the region, is optimistic about the cooperation.

Final negotiation of RCEP coincides with two important momenta that highly affect the region: economic recession prompted by the Covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing power transition in the United States after the presidential election. Despite its feat on uniting Asia-Pacific under the same trading platform, many actors view RCEP in a skeptical way, including India that was originally involved in the deal’s formulation but withdrew during the negotiation last year. India’s approach also reflects the growing animosity towards China, especially after the border clash in Himalaya early in May. Some commentators view that RCEP signals a growing Chinese dominance over Asia-Pacific, including ASEAN that has long become a battle ground between great powers. Reuter and Wall Street Journal, for instance, labelled the RCEP as the ‘China-backed trade deal’ that will eventually pose a threat to ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific countries (Pearson, 2020; Emont & Gale, 2020).

Reflection of China’s Growing Influence?

The making of RCEP has undergone a lengthy debate for eight years since it was first introduced in 2012. Prior to RCEP, several ASEAN member states and Asia-Pacific countries have been cooperating under several trade agreements; one is the Trans-Pacific Partnership/TPP that was led by the US in 2016. TPP was the emanation of Barack Obama’s strategic pivot to Asia. TPP originally became the biggest trade deal in the region by covering almost 40% of the world’s economy and—as the name suggests—bridging countries across the Pacific Ocean, from Brazil, Chile, Mexico, to Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia (Gong, 2020, p. 40).  However, under the presidency of Donald Trump, the US withdrew from the agreement, arguing that the deal will ultimately lead to decline of US manufacture and lower wages for domestic workers. As a consequence, US withdrawal left the vacuum in the Asia-Pacific that was later seized by its rival (Gong, 2020, p. 45). In later remarks, China hailed RCEP as a win for its side. “The signing of the RCEP is not only a monumental achievement in East Asian regional cooperation, but more important, a victory of multilateralism and free trade,” said China Premier Li Keqiang.

Compared to TPP and its evolution, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), RCEP is less rigorous. It puts a lower standard on policy harmonization. RCEP also doesn’t mention certain standards over labor rights or environmental protections that were covered in CPTPP. Different standards, however, are understandable since RCEP tries to bridge diverse economies, starting from the highly developed countries like Japan and Australia to developing economies like Cambodia and Laos in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the huge economic gap between countries in RCEP make some commentators believe that it will give harm to some countries in ASEAN. Big margin in economic capability will make the developed industries like China and Japan reap the most from this agreement and consequently make the economic gap within ASEAN countries exacerbated. “Who, actually, are gaining benefit from this project” is the focal point over the current debate. The RCEP and trans-Pacific Deal “together will offset global losses from the U.S.-China trade war, although not for China and the United States,” stated Petri & Plummer (2020).

Previously, China already had a number of bilateral trade agreements with members of RCEP, including ASEAN countries. However, RCEP marks a historic moment when, for the first time, the world’s second largest economy signed up in a regional multilateral trade pact. It’s without mentioning China’s geopolitics opponent—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—also included in this agreement. Despite its less rigorous standard, the sheer size of RCEP is showing its significance over Asia-Pacific political constellation. Rather than economic cooperation in itself, RCEP symbolizes a bigger geopolitics and diplomatic triumph over the region. Kishore Mahbubani, former Singapore minister of foreign affairs also pointed out during one of the Global Town Hall (GTH) panels, “RCEP is the sign of China’s victory.” Being excluded in the process, RCEP delivers a strong message to the United States that Southeast Asia and other Asian countries are growing more solid on defining their own relations. As former U.S. Trade Representative Wendy Cutler noted in his commentary,

 “RCEP is another reminder that our Asian trading partners have developed a confidence about working together without the United States (Cutler, 2020).”

Ushering the ASEAN Centrality

ASEAN countries have long been polarized when it comes to defining their approach towards China. While China is currently the biggest trading partner in the region, each country shows various degrees of cooperation or hostility toward the country. Laos, Cambodia, and other Mekong Basin countries are highly dependent, whereas countries like Malaysia, the Philippines, and including Indonesia are facing opposition both from domestic forces and policy makers. RCEP demonstrates that ASEAN countries can reach the consensus on formulating economic partnership with a partner that traditionally cooperates by using bilateral channels, including with Australia, New Zealand, and other East Asian countries that are linked under ASEAN+6 platform. RCEP can further push ASEAN regionalism, primarily on how it develops the existing ties with the additional ASEAN+6 economic cooperation.

Moreover, the signing of RCEP also asserts ASEAN’s position on defining countries relations in Asia-Pacific. Contrary to the previously mentioned opinion, some analysts argue that RCEP is a win for ASEAN’s middle power diplomacy. Given the diverse members of the mega-trade pact, neither China nor Japan as a traditional trade leader will become the architect of this agreement when it finally comes into effect. Rivalry between great powers that also pose a danger in the security aspect of the region will necessitate a different approach to bring RCEP further. Speaking in GWT, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, also stated that through RCEP, “China firmly supports the ASEAN centrality.”  ASEAN’s neutrality—emanated in last year’s ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific—in this context, will ultimately take a greater role in shaping RCEP when it comes into effect. Thus, the label “China-led agreement” is inaccurate. It was previously shown in 2012 when a stalemate over negotiation was resolved by ASEAN. Instead of being led by China, as many commentators suggest, RCEP exhibits a triumph for ASEAN. As Petri and Plummer (2020b) pointed out in Brookings,

“Without such ‘ASEAN centrality,’ RCEP might never have been launched.”  

Apart from recovering from the post-pandemic economic downturn, RCEP also expected to offset the harms caused by the years-long trade war between the United States and China. Especially for ASEAN countries that have long been affected by the rivalry, including Vietnam that hosted the ASEAN summit this year. In short, despite its less rigorous standards, RCEP can further incentivize the global value chain within the region. ASEAN, in particular, is projected to gain $19 billion annually by 2030 through this agreement (Petri & Plummer, 2020a)

Due to its volume and modesty compared to the previous trade pact, RCEP will take years before it finally comes into effect. It can also face a challenge upon the ratification in each member country, especially in the country with growing anti-China or anti-international sentiment. Malaysia, for instance, cancelled two of Belt and Road Initiatives projects after Mahathir Muhammad won the election on 2018. Regardless of its impact, RCEP will ultimately cement the position of ASEAN in a greater Asia-Pacific dynamic. The overall process and finalization of this agreement signify the message that ASEAN cannot be seen narrowly as the battle ground between the so-called ‘two great powers.’ Instead, RCEP denotes ASEAN’s rising primacy in defining their own region.

 

REFERENCES

Brookings. (2020, November 16). RCEP: A new trade agreement that will shape global economics and politics. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-agreement-that-will-shape-global-economics-and-politics/

Cutler, W. (2020, November 15). RCEP Agreement: Another Wake-up Call for the United States on Trade. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/rcep-agreement-another-wake-call-united-states-trade

Emont, J., & Gale, A. (2020, November 13). Asia-Pacific Countries Push to Sign China-Backed Trade Megadeal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/asia-pacific-countries-push-to-sign-china-backed-megadeal-11605265208

Gong, X. (2020). China’s Economic Statecraft. Security Challenges, 16(3), pp. 39-46.

Lee, Y. N. (2020, November 15). ‘A coup for China’: Analysts react to the world’s largest trade deal that excludes the U.S. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/rcep-15-asia-pacific-countries-including-china-sign-worlds-largest-trade-deal.html

Pearson, J. (2020, November 11). Asian leaders to sign China-backed trade deal amid U.S. election uncertainty. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit/asian-leaders-to-sign-china-backed-trade-deal-amid-u-s-election-uncertainty-idUSKBN27R0QJ

Petri, A. P., & Plummer, M. G. (2020, June). East Asia decouples from the United States: Trade war, COVID-19, and East Asia’s new trade blocs. https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/east-asia-decouples-united-states-trade-war-covid-19-and-east-asias-new

Writer : Arrizal A. Jaknanihan

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

The Diminishing Reputability of Police in the United States, Explained.

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A body invented to protect the masses has become an enemy to the very people whom they serve. The relationship between the US police and its citizens is a complicated matter which in recent years has become more prevalent in international discussions. Reoccurring instances of unnecessary contact and misuse of power from law enforcement have caught the attention of the US citizens and all those watching on around the world. A lack of accountability has created general mistrust, and it is clear that if reform does not occur to resolve the systemic issues that have arisen within the core of the police, the interrelation of law enforcement and the people of the United States will deteriorate further, and rapidly.

The unconventional dynamic between the citizens of the United States and its police force can be dated back to the establishment of police in America, and the responsibilities policemen were given at the time. Fundamentally, policing in Colonial America was established to keep communities in order. As society progressed, police duties grew. Eventually, as evident in modern day, police have been empowered to protect their own power and privilege most commonly in situations that allow them to exert social control over minority groups. A large aspect of tension between the police force and US citizens is the indisputable documentation of racially targeting people of colour. Slave patrols, during the colonial era, were forms of police who were responsible for punishing slaves who tried to free themselves (Romero 2020). Historically, police have had duties that inexplicitly target certain groups and have been authorised to use force with those who are not equal to them – including people of colour, low-income communities and minority groups. These factors are able to give context for the current behaviour of police officers in the United States today.

A very significant period of time that heightened tension between police and the people of the US was the aggressive response from police during the Black Lives Matter protests. After the death of George Floyd, a peaceful, wrongly accused man of colour who was pinned beneath police officers so forcefully he was unable to continue breathing, the world united to protest against police brutality specifically towards people of colour. Internationally, it was recognised that police in the United States are ignorant to the concept of equality. Research from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project found that 93 per cent of the 7,750 Black Lives Matter protests were peaceful. However, images of violent protests were what made media headlines, with the then-president Donald Trump referring to the protesters as “thugs” (Cineas 2021). Over 427 arrests were made at the peak of the protests, despite the high number of protests being conducted in peace.

In comparison, law enforcement failed to keep white-supremacist rioters at Capitol Hill under control, through blatant complicity.  The lack of both physical presence and hostility at the Capitol riot that was so clearly present at the Black Lives Matter protests has reinforced anger within the American people. Such rioters smashed windows and scaled walls, however only 69 people were arrested (North 2021). Videos taken during the riot display officers “holding hands of extremists, escorting them down steps, holding the doors of the Capitol open for them and taking selfies with them” (Cineas 2021). The clear contrast of events and reactions from the police can be seen as a combination of ignorance and racial bias. It is evident that although police were aware of the extent of the event due to it being posted on social media, they chose to support the notion of white entitlement and as a result encouraged dangerous extremists to express their opinions in the most violent way possible without serious consequence.

The path forward is complex. However, in order to mend the relationship between law enforcement and the citizens reforms must be introduced (Jabali, 2020). Firstly, systemic issues within police training and recruitment must be addressed. Police should be reminded what their role in society is, and how violent riots should prompt a different reaction to non-violent protests. Implicit-bias training should be mandated in police academy, to attempt eradicating the clear racial prejudice towards minority groups. Although it is not simple to convince everyone to think the same way, if the police force project and openly support this view then the future generation of law enforcement will carry on this important, egalitarianist mindset.

REFERENCES:

Cineas, F (2021), Whiteness is at the core of the insurrection. Retrieved 13 January, from https://www.vox.com/2021/1/8/22221078/us-capitol-trump-riot-insurrection

Romero, D (2020), Reimaging the role of Police. Retrieved 13 January, from https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/reimagining-the-role-of-police/

North, A (2021), Police Bias explains the Capitol Riot. Retrieved 13 January, from https://www.vox.com/22224765/capitol-riot-dc-police-officers

Jabali, M (2020), If you’re surprised by how the police are acting, you don’t understand US history. Retrieved 13 January, from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/05/police-us-history-reform-violence-oppression

Writer : Emily Camilleri

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

The Capitol Riot: a New Normal for US Democracy?

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The political situation in the United States has earned another spotlight after a mass riot that occurred in the capital city of Washington DC. Thousands of people stormed the Capitol Building of the United States, which was the venue for the US Congress meeting, which would certify Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump in the 2020 election. In that incident, supporters of Donald Trump tried to stop the meeting, triggering clashes with authorities. It was reported that the mob succeeded occupying the Capitol Building, causing the congress meeting to be declared a recess and its members were evacuated (Koob, 2021). There were about five casualties and 50 people were arrested (Ortiz, Bacon, Yancey- Bragg and Culver, 2021). After the incident, Mayor of Washington DC, Muriel Bowser declared a state of emergency for 15 days with the possibility of extending the status if things were not deemed to be improving.

What happened was certainly a surprise to people of the United States and the international community. The United States, which has been regarded as a pilot in implementing democracy, had illustrated what should not be carried out in a democratic process. This criticism certainly come with reasons. For world leaders, this is certainly an alarm that the US was shaken by this event. The attack on democracy in the US could also mean an attack on democracy all around the world. If this kind of riot could happen in an established democratic country like the US, this could also happen in other parts of the world. (Bennhold & Myers, 2021). From this incident, a big question arises, will this kind of condition become a new normal for the implementation of democracy in the US?

Trump Political Communication Strategy and the Cause of the Riots

To understand the context of the political turmoil that occurred, we can track the history back to the 2016 elections when Donald Trump ran for president of the United States. In his campaign, Donald Trump relied on his Post-Truth style of communication to garner sympathy from his supporters. With the help of right-wing media and social media that personally launched their versions of truth narratives. The concept of post truth itself is not new to the world of politics. Oxford Dictionaries explains that Post-Truth is a state in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.  Moreover, from recent studies of scholars it is concluded that the post-truth world emerged as a result of societal mega-trends such as: a decline in social capital, growing economic inequality, increased polarization, declining trust in science, and an increasingly fractionated media landscape (Lewandowsky, Elker, and Cook, 2017). Trump polarized the masses and divides the public through the information channels he has, both social media and right-wing mass media, which had so far fully supported the formation of good public opinion on  Trump.

Trump played this post-truth concept actively not only during his campaign period in 2016 , but also during his tenure as president. Over the past four years, Trump had fed his supporters with the narratives they want to hear, even though the truth of these narratives had been either questioned or proven wrong. Data from the Washington Post states that during his presidency, Trump issued an average of fifty false narratives every day (Kesser, Rizo, and Kelly, 2020). Unfortunately, the concept of post-truth political communication was still being implemented until the 2020 election when Trump was defeated in a political contest against Biden. On this occasion, Trump narrated that there was fraud that made him lost his vote in the election process while at the same time refusing to recognize Biden’s victory. For the past two months Trump had misinformed his supporters that his defeat was unfair.

The group of Trump supporters that felt the result was unfair carried out a riot in the Capitol as an expression of their dissatisfaction with the legal system they consider unfair. Armed with their embraced beliefs, they believed their values should apply in that country. According to Paige in his article titled Political Orientation and Riot Participation (2017), riot actors are mostly found in community groups with high level of information on political issues, but have low trust on government or authority. This explanation illustrates what happened in the riot. A group of people who feel they have a lot of information about political realities (even though those were questionable informations) showed dissatisfaction towards the government and feelt more competent to carry out political process than the authority.

A New Normal for US Democracy?

The biggest question is whether this kind of incident will become the new normal for political process in the US? Riots themselves are not something new in the US. Since the beginning of US history, riots and violent political actions have been rhetorically symbolize acts of patriotism that support freedom and independence (Jackson, 2020). This also applies to riots related to general elections. Riots have happened a lot, especially before the second world war. However, this is the first time an unrest has occurred at the national level, especially with regard to issues with presidential elections, which is a symbol of democratic supremacy in the US.

Trump as the most responsible figure for this riot may not last much longer. Currently, Trump no longer has the institutional backing or legitimacy supporting him. Even his own party has now turned to condemn him after the riot in Washington DC. Republican figures such as Senator Richard Burr of North Carolina criticized Trump’s campaign promoting a conspiracy theory that sparked unrest. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton also urged Trump to immediately admit defeat and stop spreading fake news (Dennis and Dillard, 2021). Therefore, Trump’s existence as an individual is no longer a cause for concern in the future.

Something noteworthy is the legitimacy of the socio-political conditions left by Trump. America is now divided into several political spectrum. The society is polarized based on their values and beliefs. It is dangerous that a lot of people prefer to cling to the truth they want to believe instead of the facts. As long as these differences have not been harmonized, and the community continues to cling to their respective beliefs by ignoring facts and common sense, it is not impossible that they will continue to raise their voices in various ways including riots. Moreover, if later authority failed to give deterrence, people who perpetrated the riot would repeat their actions in the future. On the other hand, those who oppose this incident would lose their trust in the government if they considered them to have failed enforcing the law and create security stability for the citizens. The public is also responsible to prevent figures like Trump, who carry out the post-truth concept and have a “go big or go home” mentality, from being given the stage to carry out their actions. Society should learn a lesson that such person is a threat for democracy

 The US’ condition as it is today will be a big homework for President-elect Joe Biden, who will carry out the mandate for the next four years. Biden must be able to become president for every community. The elected president must be able to embrace people trapped in the post-truth illusion created by Trump. Activities that tend to alienate Trump supporters as well as people with different political views will backfire on Biden and his administration as the group will have stronger legitimacy to launch future unrest under the pretext of political discrimination from the government in power. For this reason, Biden must convince everyone that the essence of democracy must be carried out in peace and  dignity for all the people of the US. If this process is successful, the attack on the Capitol will only end up as a special case in the history of US democracy. On the other hand, if Biden fails to embrace and improve the condition, it is not impossible that this kind of protest will become a new normal in US democracy.

 

References

Bennhold, K., & Myers, S. (2021). America’s Friends and Foes Express Horror as Capitol Attack ‘Shakes the World’. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/world/europe/trump-capitol-2020-election-mob.html

Dennis, S., & Dillard, J. (2021). Republicans Recoil From Trump as Violence Proves Too Much. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-07/capitol-violence-marks-opening-for-gop-to-distance-from-trump

Jackson, K. (2020). The Double Standard of the American Riot. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/06/riots-are-american-way-george-floyd-protests/612466/

Kessler, G., Rizzo, S., & Kelly, M. (2020). Trump is averaging more than 50 false or misleading claims a day. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/22/president-trump-is-averaging-more-than-50-false-or-misleading-claims-day/

Koob, S. (2021). What we know so far about the storming of the US Capitol. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/us-protests-what-we-know-so-far-about-the-storming-of-the-capitol-20210107-p56sa1.html

Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U., & Cook, J. (2017). Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era. Journal Of Applied Research In Memory And Cognition, 6(4), 353-369. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.07.008

Ortiz, Bacon, Yancey- Bragg, & Culver. (2021). DC riots live updates: Capitol Police officer dies from injuries; FBI offers $50K reward for pipe bomb suspect info. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/01/07/washington-dc-capitol-trump-riots-day-after-live-updates/6577841002/

Paige, J. (1971). Political Orientation and Riot Participation. American Sociological Review, 36(5), 810. doi: 10.2307/2093668

Writer : Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

National Security Bill and the New Phase for “Mainlandization” of Hong Kong: Is it the Beginning of the End?

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As the pandemic is beginning to decline, people of Hong Kong pour onto the street once again to protest encroachment to the city’s autonomy. By 28 May 2020, over 360 protesters were being arrested for their protest against Hong Kong’s national security bill that recently won overwhelming 2.878-1 votes from the National People’s Congress (NPC). Though the draft hasn’t yet legislated by the Standing Committee of NPC—highest legislative body from the People’s Republic—the draconian law presents imminent setback for Hong Kong’s hard-fought democracy. The proposed bill could penalize wide ranging activities, spanning from act of subversion, activity that involves foreign power, and ‘terrorist’ action that can endanger state’s security. In sum, national security bill will provide legal basis to criminalize protest against embreachment of Hong Kong’s democracy, vested by “one country-two system” principle (Bradhser, 2020). Moreover, national security bill also open the new phase of Beijing’s ‘mainlandization’ effort that bypass Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Office and even Legislative Council (LegCo) which appears to be failed in carrying such mission months earlier, before the pandemic begin to engulf both China and the city. As China declares triumphant over the months-long pandemic, mainland government begin to tighten its grip once again to secure its ‘territorial integrity.’ Addressing the issue of Hong Kong’s autonomy is becoming the matter of urgency, as the present situation indicates culmination on both China’s intrusion and pro-democracy resistance.

Mainland-Leaning Government and Long Quest for Autonomy

Though the subsequent clash came after anti-Extradition Law protest in early June 2019, greater causes of this protest can be traced back to 2014 Umbrella Movement and even earlier to 2003 anti-subversion law. After becoming separate entity from mainland China for over 150 years, Hong Kong is vested with higher degree of autonomy that guarantee city’s political, economic, and judicial system remain unchanged for 50 years since its handover from British colony on 1997. However, Hong Kong Basic Law that become materialization of ‘one country, two system’ never actually took place ever since Margaret Thatcher and Premier Zhao Ziyang signed Sino-British Joint Declaration back in 1984. Article 45, for instance, ensure universal suffrage—voting rights for all Hong Kong citizens—to elect their own government. Notwithstanding the law, after its handover to China only 35 from 70 seats from Hong Kong’s LegCo are directly voted by citizens. The rest are indirectly selected through the functional constituency, representing interest group that mainly belong to pro-Beijing faction (Lum, 2020). Effort to preserve city’s autonomy, as it enshrined by the Basic Law, became exacerbated after 2014 legislation necessitated Hong Kong Chief Executive’s candidate to be pre-approved by Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—effectively put the city’s highest executive office under strong Beijing influence (Lum, 2020).

Posed by structural problem from the city’s mainland-leaning government, safeguarding Hong Kong’s autonomy rest only on the shoulders of its people and—to limited degree—foreign pressure. Especially, from the United States and United Kingdom that is deemed to bear responsibility on preserving former crown colony’s autonomy until 2047 (Kilcoyne, 2020). Recently on 28 May, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that Hong Kong is no longer maintains ‘higher degree of autonomy’ over mainland China. The consequence is then US can possibly uplift preferential treatment to Hong Kong—status that has long sustain the city’s status as central trade hub and ‘middleman’ between US and China, especially after the onset of Trade War (Gunia, 2020). UK, alongside with Australia, New Zealand, and Canada signed a joint-statement to condemn the act of “curtailing the Hong Kong people’s liberties.” UK in particular, threatened to change the status of British National Overseas passport that will ease the path of Hong Kong people to obtain UK’s citizenship—defection in the eye of Beijing (Bradhser, 2020). Despite of the threat or any ‘naming and shaming’ from international community, question arise whether will it really help the cause of Hong Kong protest?

Will Foreign Pressure Enough?

Despite of condemnations it has undergone, China shows resilience on consolidating its power during the last few years. After Xi Jinping assumed the office of president and general secretary of CCP in 2016, China conspicuously became more assertive than ever before and gradually begin to abandon the notion to “Hide your capacities and bide your time,” back during the reformation era under Deng Xiaoping. After declaring the vision of “Great Rejuvenation of Chinese Nation” China appears willing to stain its international reputation in exchange for expanding influence and consolidating power upon the country’s periphery (Magnus, 2018, p. 204). Recent showdown in South China Sea, escalating pressure to isolate Taiwan, and ongoing mass detention in Xinjiang Province exemplified China’s resolve to secure its territorial integrity. Ultimately, integrating Hong Kong under mainland control is an integral part to achieve the so-called “China Dream.” Most notably, after Xi Jinping successfully consolidate his power when the 13th NPC decided to remove China’s presidential term limit—condition that theoretically allow him to become president for life and consequently push the “Great Rejuvenation” agenda.

Whether foreign pressures will be effective to halt the ‘mainlandization,’ certain thing is today’s China is unlike China back in 1997. Rapid economic growth that converges with higher CCP’s legitimacy during the last 23 years finally resulted in, undoubtedly, superpower in the eastern hemisphere. With its current status, China won’t face the same consequences as it did back then during Tiananmen Massacre in 1989—grave human rights violation that subsequently doomed yet-to-be-powerful China with tight sanctions. China’s audacity to detain millions Uyghurs in Xinjiang despite of international condemnations indicate that China is more than willing when it comes to ‘territorial integrity,’ that includes integrating Hong Kong into mainland’s realm (Huang, 2017, p. 239). With that being said, foreign response should reconsider whether their action will hinder China to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy or will it just lower Hong Kong’s leverage vis a vis China? US’s plan to uplift Hong Kong’s preferential treatment will not only ineffective to stop China from tightening its grip, but can also make the city to lose its economic privilege that 7.4 million Hongkongers rely on during the process (Gunia, 2020).

Is it the End for Bastion of Liberty?

Series of anti-mainland protest in Hong Kong present similar feature with other anti-imperial movements in the heart of mainland China. Most notably, the 1919 May Fourth Movement when nation-wide protest took place against the remains of Qing Dynasty and colonial power that, at that time, still retain huge concessions of the empire (Wasserstrom, 2019, p. 342). May Fourth and various movement that become resemblance of the current Hong Kong protest present similar feature when people took to the street as the government is no longer remain accountable to protect its own people. The current condition of pro-democracy protest in Hong Kong—where the government is structurally leaning towards Beijing and foreign countries can only give limited pressure to halt ‘mainlandization’ attempt—makes the people put Hong Kong’s fate to nothing else but their protest on the street.

While public gathering is still limited by health protocol, the government seemingly took the chance by legislating National Security Bill alongside with National Anthem Bill that will criminalize people who disrespect China’s national anthem. The case when government gain momentum to legislate controversial bill—that supposedly ignite mass protest before the pandemic—also not limited in China. Similarly, other case like Hungary which end legal recognition of LGBT people, India that legislate domicile law on Kashmir, and including Indonesia that recently pass the notorious mining law (UU Minerba) all took place when people access to carry protests are severely restricted. The pandemic gives disproportionate effect, not only to the general populace, but also to pro-democracy protest with their movements are being circumscribed. The pandemic also enables authoritarian order to take place by using public health and maintaining security as justification (Roth, 2020).

Sino-British Joint Declaration stipulates Hong Kong’s autonomy to remain intact until the city is fully transferred under mainland authority in 2047. Recent push on ‘mainlandization,’ however, shows that Beijing is seemingly not eager to wait for 50 years while it capable to do it more early. Albeit many believe that the future of Hong Kong’s status as “bastion of liberty” is seemingly ill-fated, Hongkongers still remain relentless on defending their hard-fought freedom, especially the youth that constitutes majority of this movement. By 2047, most Hong Kong citizen will be the people that carry protest nowadays. Quoting Joshua Wong in Tan (2020), “Time is running out in Hong Kong … (that is almost turning from) ‘one country, two systems’ to ‘one country, one system’ and (this) seems to be the beginning of the end.”  Pertaining to either Basic Law or Sino-British Declaration, Hong Kong will ultimately become the integral part of China by 2047. The face of Hong Kong after that transfer, however, fully depends on today’s resistance.

 

 

REFERENCES

Bradsher. Keith. (2020, May 28). China Approves Plan to Rein In Hong Kong, Defying Worldwide

Outcry. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/world/asia/china-hong-kong-crackdown.html.

Gunia, Amy. (2020, May 29). The U.S. Might Revoke Hong Kong’s ‘Special Status.’ Here’s What

That Means for Business in the Global Financial Hub. Time. https://time.com/5842158/hong-kong-autonomy-trade-business-china-us/

Huang, Jing. (2017). “Xi Jinping’s Taiwan Policy: Boxing Taiwan In with the One-China

Framework.” in Dittmer, Lowell (Ed). Taiwan and China. University of California Press. pp. 239-247

Kilcoyne, Matt. (2020, May 27). Our failure to help the people of Hong Kong shames us all.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/05/27/failure-help-people-hong-kong-shames-us/

Lum, Alvin. (2020, April 6). Hong Kong’s opposition targets Legislative Council seats it has not

won in over 20 years for majority bid. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3078524/hong-kongs-opposition-targets-legislative-council-seats-it

Magnus, George. (2018). Why Xi’s China Is in Jeopadry?. Yale University Press.

Roth, Kenneth. (2020, April 3). How Authoritarians Are Exploiting the COVID-19 Crisis to Grab

Power. Human Right Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/04/how-authoritarians-are-exploiting-covid-19-crisis-grab-power

Tan, Huleng. (2020, May 27). Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong says Beijing’s bill is about

boosting Communist regime, not national security. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/27/joshua-wong-beijing-bill-is-about-boosting-communist-regime-not-security.html

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. (2019). “Hong Kong Now, Shanghai Then.” in Ma, Ngok & Cheng, Edmund

  1. (Eds). The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong. Amsterdam University Press.

Writer : Arrizal Anugerah J.

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

South Korean Attitudes in Education during the Coronavirus Pandemic

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Worldwide educational systems have been affected by the coronavirus through the comprehensive closures of schools and universities. Goverments in about 73 countries implement it as of 56 states closed schools nationwide and 17 others did localized school closures.

South Korea perhaps has the most high-pressure and competitive education system in the world. The first corona virus case in South Korea was detected in January, 2020. South Korean universities have postponed the beginning of spring semester under the recommendation of Ministry of Education. Yonsei University has offered recorded video lectures, real-time telelectures and other learning materials will be provided instead of face-to-face classes until March 28. Ewha Womans University has conducted all classes via remote learning for the first two weeks of the semester. Kookmin University has created online classes for four weeks until April 11, so as Seoul National University and several other institutions. The background is they effort non-pharmaceutical interventions and preventive measures such as social-distancing or self-isolation. It prompted the widespread closure of primary and secondary schools as well as post-secondary schools including colleges and universities. Although the most confirmed patients of COVID-19 are adults, children still able to become the carrier of the virus.

Simultaneously, there are teachers who survive to deal with the shift of teaching in the classroom to online lessons. According to the experiences of Jennifer Gray and Sam Gray, teachers for elementary school grade in an international school in South Korea, they discover about Korean’s attitude in terms of tackling the situation as follows:

  • School regulates four consecutive weeks of distance learning in total. However, teachers and students have commanded one week of in-person class before the stint. This adjustment should be recognized as participation of students, parents/caregivers, teachers, administration, and other faculty under nowadays circumstances. They are engaged to struggle their multiple roles. People who take part believe that they need a community to raise and educate children.
  • Video-conference platforms help teachers to be able to meet students “face-to-face” several times a day including ‘Morning Meetings’ and ‘Closing Cirlce’ besides remote feedbacks on projects and works, live lessons, and small group conferences.
  • Developing skills in technology become an obligation when students have their personal iPads and the state provides best internet connectivity around the globe. Students likewise encourage themselves to grow their independence, problem-solving, resiliency, and ability to follow multi-step directions.

In accordance to 10 things to do list during pandemic situation on the UNESCO recommendation, Korean’s attitude as mentioned above are relevant with those points had created. The advices are:

  1. Examine the readiness and choose the most relevant tools;
  2. Ensure inclusion of the distance learning programmes;
  3. Protect data privacy and data security;
  4. Prioritize solutions to address psychosocial challenges before teaching;
  5. Plan the study schedule of the distance learning programmes;
  6. Provide support to teachers and parents on the use of digital tools;
  7. Blend appropriate approaches and limit the number of applications and platforms;
  8. Develop distance learning rules and monitor student’s learning process;
  9. Define the duration of distance learning units based on student’s self-regulation skills;
  10. Create communities and enhance connection.

Meanwhile, point (3) shows that there is an urgency of protection regarding to data security when uploading data or educational resources to web spaces, as well as when sharing them with other organizations or individuals. This matter should be initially considered by communities or societies which desire to implement an effective way of learning during this period.

South Korea correspondingly has the ‘hakwon’ or after-school activites. This place has doubled or even tripled student’s homework to make up for the class cancellations as reported in Washington Post although it had not happened in all hakwon. Parents started to worry about education gap that has caused by the coronavirus. Particularly in  Mok-dong, an affluent Seoul neighborhood known as a “special education district”. Its abundance of hakwon and good public schools cause parents spend an average of $1,000 a month on after-school classes for their children. People begin to discuss how to make up for cancelled hakwon classes and looking for private home tutors. Despite the government’s advice to close down the hakwon, two-thirds of the 25,000 hakwon in the capital city of South Korea have stayed open until February, 28.

In conclusion, school closures carriers high social and economic costs even though it is temporary. Though disruptions affect people across communities, South Korean’s collective responsibility is ingrained into the cultural psyche. Working parents in other country likely to miss their work when schools are closed in order to take care of their children. Therefore, most Korean putting their wants aside for the good and health of the community has become behavioural nature within society. However, school closures still needs to be reconsidered since how it will be runs among the low-income families who disproportionately lack access to technology, internet, data privacy and data security protection, childcare services, as well as students with disabilities.

 

References:

  • Gray, S. (2020, March 18). Live in a Coronavirus Hotzone. The Marysville Advocate. https://www.
    marysvilleonline.net/health/life-in-a-coronavirus-hot zone/article_1c5287c2-6947-11ea8c6b-4347bf87f75d.html
  • Universities in Seoul shift to online classes amidst virus fears. Yonhap News Agency. https://en.yna.co.kr/
    view/AEN20200228008800315
  • Kim, M.J. & Denver, S. (2020, Feb 28). In South Korea, coronavirus gives kids a break from school
    pressure , but also traps them. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/
    world/asia_pacific/in-south-korea-coronavirus-gives-kids-a-break-from-school-pressuresbut-also-traps-them/2020/02/27/713424f6-5896-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html

Writer : Nindita Nilasari

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

The Anti-‘Killer Robots’ Agenda: Mapping Obstacles and Exploring Possibilities for Indonesia’s Role

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Status Quo Overview

The issue of killer robots has been discussed in UN General Assembly for the past few years. ‘Killer robots’ itself is a popular terminology to describe Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) that, once activated, can select and engage dismounted human targets without further intervention by a human operator (ICRC, n.d.). At this point, it’s important to make a distinction between LAWS and drones; while drones still need human decision to an extent and are not limited to military purposes, LAWS are based on algorithms, therefore they do not necessarily require human’s affirmation before attacking their preset targets. In 2018, nearly 50 states addressed killer robots concerns in their statements to the 73rd session of the UNGA, including regarding the needs for regulation, ensuring a guarantee of human control, as well as ethical and moral questions and humanitarian law foundations about LAWS.

Recently, in the 2019 GA Session, dozens of states wished to negotiate a treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, where 30 states have agreed to ban fully autonomous weapons or LAWS. However, this is not yet the final conclusion or even an universally agreed goal of CCW meetings. In reality, discussing this issue under CCW framework in the UNGA poses a fair number of problems. First is the slow pace of its progress. Instead of reaching a conclusion about drafting regulations or abolishment, states agreed to spend the next two years developing a “normative and operational framework” to address concerns raised by such weapons systems (Wareham, 2019). Second is regarding the substantive aspects, in which states still argue about the very essence of LAWS which makes it difficult to proceed further. At this point, there is yet to be a consensus on whether LAWS should be banned or regulated, as well as contending ideas about whether the legal instrument should be a voluntary agreement or legally binding rules. These confusions prolong the eventual technical steps needed to create a convention.

Since 80% of past General Assembly resolutions are agreed by consensus, political interests of states is also another thing to consider, especially those of major power states with generally bigger bargaining positions. In the case of LAWS, big powers have stakes in whether or not killer robots should be prohibited since many of such states have already developed their own LAWS, including 4 out of 5 Security Council permanent members excluding France, all of which rejected the ban for LAWS (Ray, 2018). Moreover, some states tend to be non-contributive in the debate. As reported by Human Rights Watch, during the discussions of LAWS, United States was mostly silent and Russia was mostly obstructive (Ray, 2018). China meanwhile called for a ban only for the use but not the development LAWS, which is seen as a strategy to give them leniency in pursuing such technology for their own advantage. These attitudes then hamper states’ agreement on possible multilateral action to address the risk of LAWS. Regarding this, it has been criticized that rather than a political forum for debate on key issues, the First Committee agenda has turned into a resolution-generating machine, from which repetitive, redundant resolutions are tabled and voted on year after year (Reaching Critical Will, n.d.). And since no common understanding or consensus the goal has been reached, even the prospect of any resolution is still difficult.

Why do Middle Powers Need to be Involved?

The global discourse of LAWS is often framed as an ‘AI race’ between great powers, a situation being fed by how major powers are the ones with the highest possibility of using such technology as means of warfare. However, there are reasons why middle power states, even those without possession of LAWS, should be getting more involved in LAWS discourse. First, due to the nature of middle powers themselves. Defined here as states with level of influence below those of superpowers, but significant enough of it to become valuable players in the international level, middle powers have strategic position to influence international events. It has been explained before how debates on killer robots are often stunted by the unwillingness of major powers, and a multilateral approach must be taken in order to produce an internationally-agreed basis for the ban of LAWS. Here, one of middle powers’ characteristics which is their tendency to rely on diplomacy to pursue foreign policy goals can be influential in shaping the global norms of LAWS (Britannica, n.d.). With enough number of states being vocal for the ban of LAWS, major powers will have more reasons to submit to the norm. As we cannot wait for major powers to somehow drop their interests to secure themselves in the security dilemma, therein lies middle powers’ ‘normative’ reason to be involved in the issue of killer robots.

Discussing about norms-shaping, at this point it’s also important to remember how states are not the only stakeholders in the issue of LAWS. We cannot disregard the role of weapon manufacturers—often working for the demands of states. A survey by PAX shows a concerning result: 30 out of 50 arms producers are categorized as ‘high risk,’ meaning that they work on increasingly autonomous weapon systems and do not appear to have a policy or stance against LAWS (PAX, 2019). As private entities, the only way to be able to control what is or what is not being produced by these manufacturers is the existence of a universal, legal standard regarding LAWS. Having such legal standard promptly gives economic certainty to companies engaged in military technology producing, since they can avoid the eventual loss that might happen if the weapon they are producing suddenly becomes illegal. This is also why defense contractors including Germany’s Rheinmetall called for government to work for a treaty. The existence of a treaty will also serve as a common norm that discourages participating in economic activities that contribute to LAWS as a dangerous, high-risk, and unethical technology. Not limited to weapon manufacturers, such norm should be pushed to prevent technology companies from assisting the creation of AI-based LAWS for military purposes. However, since international humanitarian laws are only applicable to state entities and to some extent individuals, states still have to be the main party to be involved, yet another reason for middle powers to drive the agenda to shape such norms.

The second reason is a rational one. Although it is widely known that LAWS is an advanced military technology which not every state possesses, the nature of this technology has the possibility to change the outlook of modern warfare for good, which affects not only those who possesses such technology. The lack of control over killer robots and their usage mainly benefits major military powers who already have developed such technology. Vice versa, when LAWS is not outlawed or prohibited, states who do not possess such technology will be placed in a risky position due to the resulting uneven arms race. This serves as an incentive for non-possessing states to be more vocal for a ban, especially since ‘catching-up’ to major powers’ current mastery and possession of LAWS is not an easy feat to do. In place of a security dilemma, it is more logical for non-possessing states to halt further possibilities of LAWS-based warfare. In this aspect, perceiving LAWS as something disadvataging in the long run rather than just an objective pursued by major military powers serve as a  rational consideration for middle power states to hopefully be engaged to drive the agenda on LAWS prohibition.

Additionally, the current lack of LAWS in some states must not be taken for granted. If no ban is in place, it’s not impossible that other countries especially developed middle powers will follow developments in this field, guided by their own strategic context and security interests. In fact, for states such as Israel, India, and South Korea, LAWS present an opportunity to effectively police borders and respond to potential skirmishes among others (Ray, 2018), which they have begun to do so. The usage of autonomous systems for border security purposes is not a black-and-white matter—it is fair to mention that such technology might help prevent unnecessary human casualties by providing automated surveillance system, especially in heavily militarised area or in states with no large standing personnel capacity (Ray, 2018). Therefore, what needs to also be emphasized is whether or not humans retain control over the decisionmaking, an important distinction in the discussion of LAWS. There should be a consensus that a meaningful human control must be possessed by any kind of military technology to ensure responsibility of attacks as well as adhering to humanitarian law principles. This is precisely the task of international community and state actors to include humanitarian concerns in the debate of LAWS and in the formation of a potential international norms as has been discussed above.

Mapping Indonesia’s Role, or Lack Thereof  

As of now, regional organizations to some extent have been becoming stakeholders in pushing the abolishment of killer robots agenda. For example, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) parliamentary assembly has adopted a declaration urging the 57 OSCE member states “to support international negotiations to ban lethal autonomous weapons,” although this will ultimately be up to each country’s decision. Furthermore, specifically in the context of ASEAN as a regional body, the discourse of LAWS is not as advanced, perhaps due to how most of its member states are not openly pursuing the usage of LAWS. In one hand, this situation is relieving, but as has been explained, states that are  traditionally not ‘big players’ in the international arena must also step up and be proactively engaged in the global discussion on LAWS abolishment. here is no justification to ignore possibilities of LAWS, especially with how Southeast Asian states are surrounded by major powers’ geopolitical contestations which might expose these countries to the utilization of LAWS while they themselves have no similar capacity. Moreover, with some of the aforementioned states being a maritime power, it is also worthy to consider that autonomous weapon systems have been regarded as an effective means to guard maritime sovereignty, enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA), and deter incursions (Ray, 2018).

The question right now would be, where’s Indonesia? Currently, Indonesia is not listed as one of the countries wanting to ban killer robots, nor the ones opposing said ban. However, Indonesia has spoken several times about the issue of LAWS, including as a representative for Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the 74th session of First Committee General Assembly agenda.  Therefore it is safe to say Indonesia endorses NAM’s stance that a preemptive ban on killer robots is necessary, and to quote Indonesian representative’s statement on behalf of NAM, “Issues surrounding LAWS should be deliberated thoroughly in conformity to internationai law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law.” Furthermore, since NAM States Parties to CCW also support the establishment of an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) related to LAWS, it is fitting for Indonesia to be involved in a bigger capacity (Campaign To Stop Killer Robots, n.d.) by simultaneously highlighting the importance of multilateral efforts in disarmament and non-proliferation of LAWS as .has been mentioned during aforementioned NAM’s statement (Djani, 2019).

Indonesia itself has a good reason to take the mantle of regional leader. One visible advantage to this is public image: by taking the first step to be a state that supports the prohibition of LAWS and publicly stating its position against the usage of LAWS, Indonesia might be able to showcase its commitment as a formidable but peaceful middle power, as well as cementing its role as a prominent pioneering figure in both ASEAN and NAM. Not to mention, pushing for killer robots ban would also mean playing our role as a current member of both UN Security Council and Human Rights Council, a feat made better if it successfully encourage other member states to follow in the footsteps. Furthermore, to circumvent the slow process in the international fora, a regional-based appropriate frameworks regarding LAWS can be employed as one of the ways to pursue this agenda, and set the stepping stone for a international norm against LAWS.

Now is a good time as any to take the step: one reason to be optimistic about this is the apparent popular civilian support for a ban against LAWS. Global civil society seemingly has apprehensively reacted towards the existence of LAWS. A global poll taken by Ipsos in 26 countries showed  that 61% of the global respondents are opposed to killer robots. This number of opposition in an increase from the previous two years (Campaign To Stop Killer Robots, 2020). Additionally, YouGov survey across ten European countries in October found strong support for the goal of banning killer robots with more than seven in ten respondents favored their country working for an international ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems (Campaign To Stop Killer Robots, 2020). With Campaign to Stop Killer Robots that advocates for LAWS international ban has recently been launched in Southeast Asia as a regional coalition, it hopefully can take measures not only to influence decision makers through diplomatic channels but also disseminate knowledge to the general public about the risks of LAWS, which consequently may affect decisionmaking in the state level, especially in such democratic country to push for LAWS ban.

Bottom line, taking into account the current obstacles being present in the international fora as well as the pressing urgency to create a global norm regarding the ban of LAWS, the ideal thing for Indonesia is to take a firm stance and play the leadership position among the region and among middle powers to advocate this issue.With more stakeholders being vocal about how LAWS should be treated, the international community can bypass the current stagnancy and move on to produce an international legal framework.

References

“Autonomous Weapon Systems – Online Casebook.” Accessed January 8, 2020. https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/autonomous-weapon-systems.

“Defending Multilateralism in 2019.” The Campaign To Stop Killer Robots. Accessed January 8, 2020. https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2019/12/defending-multilateralism-in-2019/.

“Global Poll Shows 61% Oppose Killer Robots.” The Campaign To Stop Killer Robots. Accessed January 8, 2020. https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2019/01/global-poll-61-oppose-killer-robots/.

“Middle Power,” Encyclopaedia Britannica. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/middle-power.

“Statement by H. E. Amb. Dian Triansyah Djani, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.” First Committee General Debate, 74th Session of the UN General Assembly. New York, October 7, 2019.

“UN General Assembly First Committee.” Reaching Critical Will. Accessed January 8, 2020.  http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga.

“UN Head Calls for a Ban.” The Campaign To Stop Killer Robots. Accessed January 8, 2020. https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2018/11/unban//

PAX, ‘Slippery Slope: The arms industry and increasingly autonomous weapons,’ PAX Report, November 2019.

Ray, T. ‘Beyond the ‘Lethal’ in Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Applications of LAWS in

Theatres of Conflict for Middle Powers.’ ORF Occasional Paper (180), 2018, 4.

Wareham, M. “Ringing the Alarm on Killer Robots.” Human Rights Watch, November 21, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/20/ringing-alarm-killer-robots.

Writer: Heidira Witri Hadayani
Editor: Yunizar Adiputera, Angganararas Indriyosanti

Populism: Democracy’s Secret Killer

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2020 is expected to be an eventful year for global politics, especially with The United States (US) presidential elections scheduled for November. These elections raise concerns amongst international relations scholars on the future condition of democracy globally. This concern is mainly due to the rise of populism in international politics. Boris Johnson’s recent election as prime minister, Tayyip Erdogan rise to power in Turkey and the completion of Donald Trump’s first presidential term highlights a shift towards populist sympathies within politics. The global rise in populism over the past few years is problematic for countries and is very damaging for the state of democracy around the world.

Populism is a term used to describe a particular leadership style and is often associated with anti-establishment leaders. There are a few characteristics that identify populism as a separate style of leadership. These characteristics consist of: criticism towards the status quo, victimizing minorities, weaponizing public anger and the claim to be an anti-pluralist and anti-establishment (Muller 2016). Populism happens when there has been, “mobilization of a mass movement in pursuit of political power, this element theorizes that populists thrive where ties between voters and bureaucratic parties do not exist or have decayed.” (Kenny 2018). Trump, a populist leader, rose to power due to his disassociation with establishment politics and the mobilization of rust belt workers public anger (Sligo 2018). Populism differs greatly from identity politics because populism is especially damaging on the functioning of a democracy. Populism often creates a downgraded form of democracy that promises to create a good democracy (Muller 2016).

Donald Trump’s rise in popularity is a further evidence of the global trend amongst voters in favour of populist leaders. Donald Trump rose to power in the US by utilising populist tactics to gain votes. Trump presented himself as an anti-establishment and anti-pluralist candidate option to win the support of disassociated and disenfranchised voters. He also combined the demands and consolidated the concerns of rust belt workers, thus gaining their support (Sligo 2018). Populist tactics ultimately won Trump the 2016 election. Trump also displays a variety of other characteristics of a populist leader. For example, his continual attack on minorities by often using of them as a scapegoat for national issues. Trump does this by attacking the Latin immigrant population blaming crime and drug problems on this minority community (Anbinder 2019). These traits not only mark Trump as a populist leader but highlight the damages he has caused on the functioning of America’s democracy.

Donald Trump’s presidency as an anti-establishment, populist leader has had a severe impact on standard of America’s democracy.  A clear ramification of Donald Trump presidency is his damage on the freedom of the press, a tool he uses to build his anti-establishment image. Trump’s does this through consistent attacks on journalists as the “enemy of the people” and the labelling of many news agencies as producers of “fake news”. These actions by Trump undermine the legitimacy of the press and its important democratic function to hold those in power accountable. Trumps vilification of journalists as enemies’ positions them to be working against the interests of the people thus, influencing the American populous perception of the press. Further, The White House Press Secretary has also significantly reduced the number of press conferences held in the White House limiting the presses access to Government reporting. These subtle actions undertaken by Trump limit the US citizens ability to access free press causing a downgrade in America’s democracy. In 2019 The Economist’s Democracy Index, America is rated as a flawed democracy with a 7-8 rating out of 10. Thus, proving the negative impact Donald Trump has had on the functioning of America’s democracy.

The impact of the rise in populist movement is already causing a ripple effect globally.   In the Economist 2019 Democracy Index, only 22 out of 167 countries were classified as a full democracy and only 54 out of 167 countries were classified as a flawed democracy. The global democracy score is 5.44 which is the lowest score since The Economist started the democracy index in 2006 (The Economist 2019). When looking at these figures of democracy’s current struggle, it is important to consider the patterns and fluctuations of democracy that have always occurred since its creation. Therefore, whilst there may be a decline in the global standard of democracy, it is important to believe in the strength of democracy as it is likely to recover in the years to come as leaders come and go (Carothers and Youngs 2017).

 

References:
Anbinder, Tyler. 2019. “Trump has spread more hatred of immigrants than any American in history.” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/trump-has-spread-more-hatred-of-immigrants-than-any-american-in-history/2019/11/07/7e253236-ff54-11e9-8bab-0fc209e065a8_story.html.

Carothers, Thomas, and Richard Youngs. 2017. “Democracy is not Dying .” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-04-11/democracy-not-dying.

Kenny, Paul. 2018. Populism in Southeast Asia. Cambridge : Cambride University Press.

Muller, Jan. 2016. What is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sligo, Frank. 2018. “Trump’s Populism.” Media International Australia 169: 131-143.

The Economist. 2019. Democracy Index 2019. Washington: The Economist.

Writer: Ellie Hawthorne

Editor: Angganararas Indriyosanti

Indonesia’s Response on South China Sea : Too Late, Too Lame

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At the beginning of the new decade, international community were immediately greeted with several turmoil. One that received the most attention from Indonesian audiences was the sailing of several Chinese vessels into Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Natuna Islands region, Riau Islands Province. Moreover, two of the dozens vessels sailing were Chinese coastguard vessels specifically tasked to secure the interests of China in its claimed territory in the South China Sea (Lo, 2020).

This event certainly received a strong reaction from the people of Indonesia. Firstly, this is because the China’s action in Natuna region is clearly an illegal act. China specifically violated the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which regulates maritime control zones based on coastlines. The law clearly states that a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is 200 km from the country’s outer coastline. However, China itself has their own version of EEZ called the Nine-Dash Line which is a line made unilaterally by China without going through legal conventions. The determination of the nine-dash line itself refers to the historical territory of the seas of Chinese fishermen since the Dynasty era and begin to pop up in the map of modern China since 1947. Legally since 2016, an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that China has no legal basis to claim “historic rights” within its nine-dash line (Jiangtao & Mai, 2020). With such unlawful behavior, it is not surprising that the public demand the Indonesian government to react strongly in order to maintain the country’s authority and sovereignty.

The second reason that made the community’s react aggressively was people’s sentiment towards China in Indonesia. Since the election period, the issue of China has become one of the main issues where President Jokowi is considered to be too dependent on China. In the economic sector, Mr. President sometimes considered tending to marginalize his domestic public interests to keep China happy. Along with the issue of Uyghurs, which recently receives a sharp spotlight from Indonesian Moslem, who strongly condemn China’s treatment towards Uyghurs Moslem minority. The government response to the violation of sovereignty by China is highly awaited because it is considered to be a test of Indonesia’s assertiveness in dealing with threats from outside, especially a real threat from China, a country that Indonesia is considered to be too dependent on.

When China finally does its action in Natuna, which actually has been feared since the escalation of South China Sea dispute in the mid- 2010s, Indonesian government can not provide a strong response that could satisfy the public interest and give a tangible solutions for the problem. In its response, Indonesia seem to be unprepared to face the problem of sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Although a form of diplomatic protest note had been submitted to the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs, the contents of the diplomatic note were rejected outright by the Chinese side by emphasizing that they have claims in the region. To appease public, Indonesian government tried to explain that this problem was not a serious problem that had to be exaggerated (Anwar, 2020).

The lack of response regarding the issue of South China Sea started since the 2014 presidential campaign period. At that time, when asked about Indonesia’s position regarding South China Sea, Jokowi stated emphatically that Indonesia had no part in the South China sea dispute. According to him there is no area of Indonesia that is under a threat to be claimed in this dispute (Arief, 2014). After becoming president, it was clear that Jokowi were hesitate and reluctant to resolve the problems in South China Sea. Whereas since 2016, China has openly stated that some parts of the Natuna sea is included in the territorial waters of China based on nine-dash line that they use for territorial determination. The World Maritime Axis declared by the president in fact also does not provide any solution other than strengthening domestic maritime connectivity through infrastructure development. During his first period as president, Jokowi seemed hesitant to take confident steps in order to not sever relations with China as one of the main business and investment partners who played a major role in financing the development efforts undertaken by the Joko Widodo government (Conelly, 2017).

Indonesia’s biggest opportunity lost is to bring this problem to the international level and become a leader for ASEAN countries who are also in dispute in this region. In practice, Indonesia tends to take its own steps without involving other ASEAN countries in taking strategic steps against China. This makes other countries in Southeast Asia become more isolated and vulnerable to the pressure of Chinese diplomacy (Conelly, 2017). Whereas, Indonesia’s leadership in dealing with China in South China Sea dispute can also become the answer to all doubts about Indonesia’s role as a natural born leader in the ASEAN region which increasingly has become irrelevant after the end of the New Order Regime. In dealing with China in this dispute, countries in ASEAN now tend to take their own steps so that they don’t need to put strong diplomatic pressure on Beijing. As a result, violations after violations are still being carried out by China in disputed areas in the South China Sea. The presence of Indonesia as the leader of ASEAN countries in this dispute can also reduce interdependence to global major power while preventing the involvement of outsiders which could actually heightened the political atmosphere. For example, the US involvement in South China Sea dispute, with a global political climate that is heating up, the involvement of outsiders such as the US in the South China Sea dispute can trigger more serious conflicts such as the possibility of an armed war in the East Asia region that is feared to have a chain effect to encourage another major war in the near future.

What’s Next for Indonesia?

Now that China has seriously disrupted Indonesia’s sovereignty in Natuna waters, of course, strategic steps must be taken immediately by the Indonesian government. Unilateral diplomacy efforts have been carried out and led resulting in explicit rejection by the Chinese government. This exact moment is the time for Indonesia to shift through a multilateral approach in response to China. Multilateral diplomacy involving other ASEAN countries which are also in dispute must be implemented immediately. Indonesia must emerge as the leader of ASEAN by bringing the issue of the South China Sea dispute as the main topic to be discussed at the ASEAN Summit which is scheduled to take place in April / May 2020.

Although armed conflict is not the best way out of this dispute given the potential causality that can be generated, steps like sending the military to Natuna Island to face the worst possibility is a step that needs to be explored as long as it is still in accordance with the rules of international law, especially with the need to convince public that Indonesia is serious in dealing with violations of sovereignty and responding the claim on the Jokowi government‘s dependence on China.

 

References
Anwar, M. (2020). Luhut: Soal Natuna Tak Usah Dibesar-Besarkan Lah!. Retrieved 6 January 2020, from https:// www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20200103200210-4-127579/luhut-soal-natuna-tak-usah-dibesarbesarkan-lah

Arief, T. (2014). DEBAT CAPRES: Jokowi Menyatakan Indonesia Tidak Terlibat Sengketa Laut China Selatan | Kabar24 – Bisnis.com. Retrieved 6 January 2020, from https://kabar24.bisnis.com/ read/20140623/355/237935/debat-capres-jokowi-menyatakan-indonesia-tidak-terlibat-sengketalaut-china-selatan

Conelly, A. (2017). Indonesia di Laut China Selatan: Berjalan Sendiri. Lowry Institute. Retrieved from https://www. lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/documents/Indonesia%20di%20Laut%20Cina%20Selatan.pdf

Jiangtao, S., & Mai, J. (2020). China’s Xi Jinping rejects any action based on international court’s South China Sea ruling. Retrieved 6 January 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/ article/1988990/chinas-xi-jinping-rejects-any-action-based

Lo, K. (2020). Indonesia-Beijing dispute could lead to tough South China Sea code. Retrieved 6 January 2020, from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3044374/how-indonesias-south-chinasea-dispute-beijing-could-lead

Writer : Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Demonstrasi: Ruang Publik yang Maskulin, Patriarkis, dan Ricuh?

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Di Indonesia, demonstrasi memiliki konotasi yang negatif karena lekat dengan memori-memori yang menakutkan. Tanpa menghubungkan keduanya, demonstrasi—yang lebih populer dengan istilah ‘demo’—kerap diidentikkan dengan aksi laki-laki dan kericuhan. Hasilnya, terdapat ketakutan dan kekhawatiran dari keluarga maupun teman apabila anggota keluarga perempuan atau teman perempuan mereka mengikuti aksi massa. Demonstrasi mahasiswa di berbagai kota di Indonesia dua minggu belakangan membawa kisah-kisah baru tentang keterlibatan perempuan. Banyak perempuan yang ikut turun ke jalan, walaupun—berbicara dari pengalaman dan pengamatan pribadi—diwanti-wanti untuk tidak usah ikut oleh keluarga, dilarang hingga harus berbohong, atau lolos ikut dengan memanfaatkan cela tidak ditanya oleh keluarga karena dianggap sudah pasti tidak mungkin ikut.

Seusai aksi, cuitan-cuitan populer di Twitter dan beberapa refleksi teman-teman perempuan yang mengikuti aksi, menyayangkan demonstrasi yang dipercayai masih berbudaya patriarki. Demo yang di berbagai kota berakhir ricuh jadi ruang yang ‘tidak aman bagi perempuan’. Di tengah kondisi yang sulit, ada yang mengingat kerelaan para lelaki untuk ‘pasang badan’ dan memprioritaskan perempuan sebagai solidaritas. Ada pula yang mengkritik ‘perlakuan spesial’ untuk perempuan berlawanan dengan tuntutan perempuan yang ingin diperlukan dengan setara. Apabila ingin kesetaraan, mestinya perempuan siap dengan sifat alami demo yang keras dan berbahaya, kan?

Dari pengamatan tersebut, muncul sebuah kegelisahan: Apakah memang benar demonstrasi adalah ruang publik yang secara alamiah maskulin, patriarkis, dan ricuh? Atau ini sebenarnya masalah keterbatasan referensi dan imajinasi kita tentang aksi massa? Waktu saya terlibat dalam demonstrasi pada 23 September lalu, ketika berjalan pulang seusai aksi dengan teman-teman saya, ada seorang yang bersorak kepada saya, “hidup perempuan yang melawan!”. Pada saat itu saya merasa senang. Saya menganggap sorakan tersebut sebagai apresiasi personal. Saat saya kembali mengikuti demonstrasi seminggu kemudian, saya mendengar jargon-jargon: Hidup Mahasiswa Indonesia! Hidup Rakyat Indonesia! Hidup Buruh! Hidup Petani! beberapa kelompok lainnya juga disebutnya hingga kemudian diakhiri dengan Hidup Perempuan yang Melawan! Mendengar itu, saya merasa ada yang janggal. Saya percaya jargon tersebut datang dari maksud yang baik. Namun, dari situ saya baru menyadari, ternyata keikutsertaan perempuan dalam perlawanan masih dianggap sebagai sesuatu yang baru, unik, dan jarang sehingga perlu diberi label khusus. Padahal, dalam memori saya, perempuan telah dan selalu melawan.

Perempuan yang Melawan
Sepanjang sejarah, perempuan terlibat dalam berbagai perlawanan nirkekerasan di berbagai belahan dunia
memperjuangkan berbagai isu. Pada abad ke-19, di Amerika, perempuan berjuang untuk mendapatkan hak
pilih. Pada tahun 1970an, perempuan-perempuan di India melakukan aksi memeluk pohon yang dikenal sebagai ‘Gerakan Chipko’ untuk melindungi pohon dan hutan. Pada tahun 1976 hingga 1983, ibu-ibu Plaza de Mayo di Argentina melakukan aksi jaga untuk menuntut kepulangan anak-anak mereka yang dihilangkan paksa. Pada tahun 2003, dari Liberia, para perempuan melakukan kampanye perlawanan nirkekerasan yang menuntut perdamaian dan berakhirnya perang sipil. Pada tahun 2018, dari Swedia, seorang anak perempuan berusia lima belas tahun melakukan aksi mogok sekolah untuk menuntut kebijakan perubahan iklim. Aksinya sekarang menjadi sorotan global serta memantik berbagai aksi mogok dan demonstrasi di berbagai negara.
Indonesia juga menyimpan banyak cerita perlawanan nirkekerasan oleh perempuan. Sejak tahun 1990-an hingga 2010, dari tanah Mollo, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Mama Aleta Baun melawan perusahaan-perusahaan tambang marmer dengan menenun di atas batu. Dari Jawa Tengah, perempuan petani Kendeng datang ke Istana dan melakukan aksi mengecor kaki. Pada tahun 2017, dari Jawa Barat, perempuan warga adat Sunda Wiwitan berada di baris paling depan dalam aksi tidur untuk menghalau alat berat yang akan mengeksekusi lahan cagar budaya dan tanah adat Sunda Wiwitan. Sejak tahun 2017 pula, Women’s March diadakan di Indonesia. Sejak 18 Januari 2007, terinspirasi dari perlawanan ibu-ibu Plaza de Mayo, ibu-ibu dan keluarga korban pelanggaran HAM melakukan aksi Kamisan. Aksi tersebut masih berlanjut hingga sekarang.
Mengetahui ini semua, tidak rela rasanya untuk setuju dengan asumsi bahwa aksi massa adalah ranah laki-laki dan selalu berpotensi ricuh. Sepertinya, asumsi tersebut dari keterbatasan referensi dan imajinasi terhadap aksi massa.

Aksi Nirkekerasan
Menurut Gene Sharp (1973), seorang tokoh penting dalam studi nirkekerasan, demonstrasi—atau demo—
sebenarnya hanyalah satu dari 198 metode aksi nirkekerasan yang dapat dilakukan. Sharp dengan teorinya ‘consent theory of power’ percaya bahwa kekuasaan (power) tidak bersifat monolitik—melainkan pluralistis. Daya/kekuasaan seseorang bukan datang dari dirinya sendiri, melainkan diberikan oleh orang-orang yang membiarkan diri mereka dikuasai. Oleh karena itu, aksi nirkekerasan merupakan metode melawan tanpa kekerasan dengan menarik kepatuhan yang diberikan kepada lawan sehingga bisa lepas dari kuasa lawan.
Dalam praktiknya di negara demokratis, aksi nirkekerasan sering digunakan sebagai jalur informal ketika jalur-jalur formal tidak menyalurkan aspirasi rakyat. Dalam sejarahnya, aksi nirkekerasan merupakan metode dalam perlawanan nirkekerasan yang digunakan untuk melawan ketidakadilan sosial serta berbagai macam bentuk kekerasan struktural (Stephan dan Chenoweth, 2008; Sharp, 2013; Dudouet, 2017).

Artinya, demonstrasi sejatinya adalah salah satu metode perlawanan yang menolak baik kekerasan langsung
maupun kekerasan struktural. Sayangnya, riset oleh tim Damai Pangkal Damai yang meneliti aksi nirkekerasan
di Indonesia dari tahun 1997 sampai 2018 menemukan bahwa repertoar masyarakat Indonesia dalam melakukan aksi nirkekerasan masih terbatas pada demonstrasi. Dari 13,524 entri aksi nirkekerasan yang ditemukan, 5,362 (29,6%) di dalamnya merupakan aksi demonstrasi. Sayangnya lagi, repertoar utama dalam aksi nirkekerasan di Indonesia sendiri memiliki konotasi yang negatif.

Di bagian sebelumnya, telah dipaparkan repertoar-repertoar alternatif dalam melakukan aksi nirkekerasan.
Berbagai kisah perlawanan perempuan di atas bukan hanya untuk menunjukkan keikutsertaan perempuan dalam perlawanan sedari dulu, tetapi juga untuk memberikan memori perjuangan alternatif sebagai referensi dan ruang imajinasi yang baru dalam melakukan aksi massa. Aksi-aksi di atas bukan tanpa ancaman. Mama Aleta dan rakyat Mollo menghadapi intimidasi dan kekerasan
hingga harus bersembunyi di hutan selama melakukan perlawanan. Aksi mengecor kaki memiliki risiko kesehatan yang sangat tinggi. Perempuan Sunda Wiwitan memasang badan mereka di hadapan alat berat. Tanpa mengatakan bahwa perempuan adalah faktor penentu damainya suatu aksi, berbagai contoh oleh perempuan di atas mengajarkan pentingnya menahan diri untuk menggunakan kekerasan dalam aksi nirkekerasan. Dalam pertimbangan strategis, kesetiaan untuk tidak menggunakan kekerasan dalam perlawanan adalah tentang (1) menjaga legitimasi perlawanan, dan (2) melawan secara kreatif.

Aksi nirkekerasan merupakan metode yang efektif bagi kelompok marginal/yang lebih lemah karena dia merupakan metode berkonflik yang kreatif. Dalam kondisi ketimpangan kekuatan, akan lebih sulit untuk menang dengan kekerasan. Masyarakat sipil tidak mungkin menang menggunakan kekerasan melawan negara sebagai entitas yang memiliki sumber daya ekonomi, legitimasi, media, dan sebagai pemilik hak melakukan kekerasan secara sah. Dan dengan menggunakan kekerasan, akan sangat mudah bagi negara untuk mendelegitimasi perlawanan dengan melabelinya sebagai ancaman yang dapat dihancurkan dengan kekerasan.

Maka, sesuai dengan apa yang ditawarkan Sharp, yang harus dilakukan adalah menarik sumber-sumber kekuasaan dari lawan—atau disebut pillars of support. Pillars of support ini dapat termanifestasi sebagai polisi, pasukan keamanan, partai politik, media, dan yang lainnya—termasuk lewat pembiaran atau act of omission. Menjaga legitimasi menjadi penting untuk menyasar pilar-pilar ini agar bersimpati dengan aktivis nirkekerasan sehingga mereka berhenti menopang penguasa dan berbalik mendukung perjuangan. Sebagai contoh singkat, strategi ini tercermin dalam gerakan ibu-ibu Plaza De Mayo. Menyadari segala bentuk tuntutan yang terlihat seperti ancaman bagi pemerintah hanya mendapat respons yang represif, ibu-ibu di Argentina datang sebagai ibu-ibu yang sedang mencari anaknya. Mereka berkeliling menggunakan syal putih yang menyimbolkan popok dengan dituliskan nama dan tanggal lahir anak-anak mereka yang hilang—menanyakan di mana anak mereka. Setidaknya terdapat tiga pilar yang berhasil mereka sasar: polisi, media, dan ibu-ibu yang tidak melawan. Polisi yang biasanya menangkap dan kemudian menghilangkan pula orang-orang yang mempertanyakan orang-orang yang dihilangkan, tidak bisa menangkap para perempuan yang sebagai seorang ibu menanyakan di mana anaknya. Media yang selama ini diam mulai menyoroti kasus dan perjuangan ini. Ibu-ibu yang selama ini diam mendapat keberanian dan bersolidaritas untuk melawan.

Memperluas Imajinasi Aksi Massa
Sepertinya, imajinasi kita melakukan aksi massa masih memberi ruang bagi kekerasan. Saat merencanakan aksi, kita menyiapkan mental dan energi untuk melindungi perempuan—alih-alih menyalurkannya untuk menciptakan ruang aman untuk bersama. Laki-laki dan perempuan adalah setara. Tentunya, kesetaraan itu terefleksikan dalam hak tidak mengalami kekerasan dan bukannya bertanding ketahanan mengalami kekerasan, bukan? Apakah imajinasi kita harus se-masochist itu? Di titik ini, kita mungkin perlu mengkaji ulang apakah demonstrasi 98 adalah referensi yang tepat untuk jadi pijakan imajinasi kita tentang gerakan mahasiswa? Padahal, ingatan masyarakat Indonesia tentang 1998 masih sangat terpolarisasi: Gerakan Mahasiswa 98 atau Kerusuhan 98? Ada yang mengingatnya sebagai kemenangan perlawanan, ada yang mengingatnya sebagai periode kekerasan yang mengerikan. Mungkin, kekhawatiran keikutsertaan perempuan dan konotasi negatif demonstrasi adalah produk memori-memori kekerasan masa lalu yang kita rayakan.

Aksi #GejayanMemanggil yang sudah dua kali dilakukan berlangsung dan berakhir dengan damai. Aksi ini juga berhasil tidak meninggalkan sampah, menjadi ruang yang aman bagi semua, akomodatif terhadap tuntutan perempuan, serta menjalin hubungan dengan polisi, pedagang, dan warga sekitar. Besar harapan saya, memori-memori ini dapat menjadi memori kolektif kita terhadap aksi nirkekerasan di Indonesia ke depannya. Tulisan ini mengajak mengingat berbagai perlawanan perempuan yang dapat menjadi referensi alternatif kita dalam melakukan aksi massa nirkekerasan. Di mana perempuan bukan hanya untuk dilindungi, bukan menjadi korban, tetapi melawan dan menolak kekerasan.

Referensi
Dudouet. (2017). Powering to Peace: Integrated Civil Resistance and Peacebuilding Strategies. International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. Retrieved from http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org
Sharp, G. (1973). The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent.
———–. (2013). How nonviolent struggle works. United States: The Albert Einstein Institution.
Stephan, M., & Chenoweth, E. (2008). Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. International Security, 33(1), 7-44. doi: 10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.7

Penulis : Grace Lolona Alexis Hutapea

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer Appointed as Germany’s New Defense Minister: What’s in Store?

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On Wednesday (17/7/2019) in Bellevue Castle Berlin, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (widely referred to by her
initials “AKK”) was appointed as Germany’s new defense minister to replace Ursula von der Leyen that left the post to become European Commission President. AKK, who has been dubbed as Angela Merkel’s protégé, also leads Germany’s center-right Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) party. Naturally, her appointment also brought new changes and reactions within the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and the CDU itself, German’s domestic political reconfiguration are on the move. Come as a surprise, almost no one expected the leader of the CDU to take the post, not with that kind of responsibility and challenge to divide concentration. Previously, Angela Merkel has emphasized the importance to replace von der Leyen with someone from CDU-Lower Saxony branch too to sit in the cabinet, however none of the CDU minister candidate came from there (Riedel, 2019). Surprisingly as well, she ‘beats’ Peter Tauber, the former CDU secretary general, veteran and current Reserve Captain in the Bundeswehr, a prominent candidate favored by the soldiers. This of course, disappointed many in the Bundeswehr. Yet, expecting defense minister to have served in the military to performed well is utterly nonsense, as minister can and should rely on the professionalism of the Bundeswehr, argued Carlo Masala, a security policy expert at the Bundeswehr University (Deutsche Welle, 2019).

Despite stumbled into a scandal when she accused the Bundeswehr to have some right-wing extremists within its rank (which drew heavy criticism from the troops), von der Leyen actually set good reference for her successor. Von der Leyen managed to keep the pace to modernize the Bundeswehr, in material, personnel and budget; making it as an ever ready armed forces in Europe and more attractive to young recruits. AKK has to stand to this standard, at least by avoiding controversies on ‘right-wing extremists’ comments, despite the effort to actually combat them within the Bundeswehr. She needs to genuinely learn and listen more to the troops with her non-military background to earn trust. “Germany can rely on you! And you can rely on me.”, as she said to the Bundeswehr (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2019).

Although simultaneously leading the CDU too, which many concerned the heavy burden and responsibility she
has to take, her appointment as defense minister can actually brought new wind of change for the Bundeswehr. The dual responsibilities means she has greater political weight as a CDU leader and can assert more power to influence the political arena in favor for the Bundeswehr needs; and it rarely happens, this is the first time since the 1960s. As her recent statement shows, this might well be the case, as she urged the needs to enlarge defense spending to 2% by 2024 despite heavy criticism from the opposition, which means 0,63% higher than the 2020 budget (Handelsblatt, 2019). The increase is to sustain Bundeswehr commitment to the NATO and EU, as well as a response to Donald Trump’s previous yelps at NATO members’ lack of commitment on defense budget. As von der Leyen take the seat in Brussels, Bundeswehr position and contribution might be increased; and it will require a lot of money. Starting out with good impression and ability to fulfill the commitment, AKK could be on the right track in the eyes of the Bundeswehr.

In the political sphere, this might be the beginning of German “Frauenpower” succession in the throne. As a former Minister-President of Saarland, AKK had earlier withdrawn from public office, but as if following the footstep of her mentor, Merkel, she took the ministerial job. Is it CDU strategy to prepare her as the next chancellor? AKK has never held any cabinet positions and the appointment could be a test-bed for what she has in store for Germany. As widely reported, Jens Spahn, another CDU veteran and Health Minister, was also eyeing the defense minister post in line with his ambition to become the next chancellor. On the other side, AKK appointment could also be seen as an attempt to boost CDU leverage after its catastrophic loss in European Parliament against the Green Party. Whether it is by design or not, we have to see AKK’s performance if she indeed wants to prepare for the 2021 elections; still plenty of time left for other candidates to outshine her. In the end, the defense minister is an appealing post for ambitious politicians that need good stepping stone, but that’s not what the Bundeswehr wants and needs. Time and attention need to be given by whoever become the defense minister for the 181.377 troops under his/her command, and it requires pure commitment (Bundeswehr,2019). For now, that’s what AKK needs to focus on, and other things will follow.

References:
Bundeswehr. (2019). Stärke: Militärisches Personal der Bundeswehr. Retrieved from https://www.
bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/streitkraefte/grundlagen/staerke/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykss
y0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MQgKcXQw8fY2dnAwDjYzcwwz1wwkpiAJKGAAjgb6wSmp-
pFAM8xxmRESCFSkH6UflZVYllihV5BfVJKTWqKXmAxyoX5kRmJeSk5qQ
H6yI0SgIDei3KDcUREAGR5wyw!!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL292
2TPCD0IM3BB1Q22TQ0
Deutsche Welle. (2019). New German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer out to win over
military.Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/new-german-defense- minister-annegret-krampkarrenbauer-
out-to-win-over-military/a-49722715
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. (2019). AKK zur Bundeswehr: „Sie können sich auf mich verlassen“ (Video
File). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ln5o03fHMEM
Handelsblatt. (2019). Kramp-Karrenbauer fordert deutlich höhere Rüstungsausgaben. Retrieved from https://
www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-kramp-karrenbauer-fordert-deutlichhoehere-
ruestungsausgaben/24682774.html
Riedel, Donata. (2019). Von der Leyens Nachfolger soll noch heute feststehen. Handelsblatt. Retrieved
from https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundesverteidigungsministervon-
der-leyens-nachfolger-soll-noch-heute-feststehen/24667250.html?ticket=ST-5915893-
P1Zj0gNqbVxBAJdw9rUe-ap6

Writer :M. Ilham R. Adamy, S.IP