Entries by iis.fisipol

[RECAP] Cangkir Teh #1 : : “Defending Democracy Amidst a Pandemic–Nonviolent resistance in Indonesia and the World 2020.”

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The first Cangkir Teh discussion was held on Monday, February 22nd 2021. The discussion was a collaborative effort between the Institute of International Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada (IIS UGM) and Damai Pangkal Damai Team (DPD). This forum’s main agenda is to discuss and dissect the “Defending Democracy Amidst a Pandemic–Nonviolent resistance in Indonesia and the World 2020” report. On this occasion, IIS invited three speakers, which are: Diah Kusumaningrum, International Relations Professor at Universitas Gadjah Mada and researcher at IIS UGM, Ihsan Ali Fauzi, representative of Centre for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD) Paramadina, and Puri Kencana Putri, representative of Accenture Malaysia and ex-journalist for KontraS. This session was moderated by Cut Intan Auliannisa Isma, Manager of IIS UGM.

Diah started the discussion by explaining the background of the Damai Pangkal Damai initiative, a project aiming to create a database of nonviolent actions in Indonesia during the Reform era. The team, also involving students’ role, has successfully compiled 14.023 nonviolent actions in Indonesia during the reform era. It is hoped that the database would assist actors who are willing to involve themselves in nonviolent actions, including students, indigenous communities, or even journalists who are eager to learn about peaceful journalism. Additionally, Diah also hopes that the government and the police would learn nonviolent principles and implement those in daily life whilst also strengthening democracy in Indonesia. The DPD team believes that the most crucial culture in democracy is conducting contestations whilst implementing nonviolent principles.

The session is then continued by discussing the report’s content. It is hoped that the report would act as a document that can be used in reflecting and learning about nonviolent actions in Indonesia during the Reform era, as it was launched on World Day of Social Justice. The report is divided into several essential parts, starting with an executive summary. Diah stated that in 2020, nonviolent methods of actions were widely adopted in various movements around the world, starting from Indonesia, the US, Tunisia, Hong Kong, and many others–all of which can be categorized in Gene SHarp’s 198 methods of nonviolent action. This proved that the pandemic does not end the mobilization of nonviolent actions in the world; instead, it makes nonviolent action increasingly more important than before.

The COVID-19 pandemic does not diminish the mobilization of nonviolent actions. Instead, it introduces new actors in nonviolent action, such as KPop fans, middle-class white American women, and even war veterans. Other than that, the intensity of actions in various places are also increasing, and they become objects of solidarity and transnational learning. Unfortunately, in some cases, nonviolent actions are often appropriated by right-wing movements, such as anti-mask and anti-vaccine protests and even white supremacist campaigns. It is also regrettable how in many cases, nonviolent actions also receive repression from the state. In her closing statement, Diah advocates for the normalization of nonviolent actions as a part of democratic culture and it should not be met with repression.

Furthermore, the second speaker continued the session, Ihsan, who articulated his appreciation towards the DPD database. Ihsan stated that the database supports nonviolent studies in Indonesia and is a significant and great output from campus. Ihsan also supports students’ involvement in the research process, and he hopes that other universities in Indonesia would use the database. However, Ihsan also expressed a few challenges that the DPD team will face in the future, including continuity and media partnership. So far, the database has only been used by one media (KOMPAS) as a data resource. Ihsan hopes that the DPD team and IIS could pick an alternative partner other than Kompas in the future.

Lastly, Ihsan expressed his concerns about the shifting of the arena from offline to online. Ihsan emphasized that there is a possibility that those who previously actively participated in nonviolent actions have become disengaged because of the pandemic and state repression. Are the new players in online nonviolent actions stop the participation of previous players? Do the participation of online activists stop at clicking their gadgets, or do they go beyond that? How does civil society respond to the online presence of the state through buzzers and influencers? Lastly, Ihsan also stresses that the report also needs to write about the defeat that nonviolent actions experience.

As the last speaker, Putri also expressed her appreciation for the work the DPD team does, she also hopes that many actors in the society could widely use the output of the DPD team. Besides, Putri presented her materials, titled “Digital Authoritarianism” or “Otoritarianisme Digital”, as an input for the DPD team in conducting their future research. Digital authoritarianism becomes more apparent during the pandemic, marked by the government’s collaboration with right-wing movements. Those right-wing groups often involve themselves in advocating voices that are not in line with civil society’s voices; their involvement also indirectly hinders criticism against the government. Furthermore, cases in the US show that the state also involves espionage, digital surveillance, and even intervention in elections. In practice, the state’s digital authoritarianism threatens freedom of expression in the digital sphere.

The forum is closed with a discussion session that involves both the speakers and the participants, which went very well.

Writer : Raditya Bomantara

Editor : Mariola Yansverio

Sistem Senjata Otonom Mematikan : Sebuah Acuan Dasar Untuk Kajian Dan Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia

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Klik tautan berikut untuk mengunduh file Sistem Senjata Otonom Mematikan : Sebuah Acuan Dasar Untuk Kajian Dan Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia [tersedia dalam versi Bahasa Indonesia dan versi Bahasa Inggris] :

http://bit.ly/PrimerKillerRobots

It’s Time to Rethink Jakarta’s Water Governance

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As if the COVID-19 crisis is not enough, Jakarta is now also facing another flood catastrophe. Most recently, flooding affected around 200 neighborhood units (RT) and forced more than 1,000 people to evacuate their homes.

Indonesia is currently facing a series of disasters including floods, landslides, whirlwinds and extreme droughts in some parts of the country. According to the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB), the number of disasters has nearly tripled in the past five years from around 1,664 in 2015 to 3,023 in 2020.

Of course the usual culprit of these disasters is climate change, which according to Prof. Edvin Aldrian of the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) is caused by environmental changes and degradation within and without the country.

While it is not untrue, there is more than meets the eye: it is the failure of urban water planning and governance which has contributed to Jakarta’s persistent flooding. Overlooking the root causes will not only undermine the deeper issue, but also shift the attention to quick and temporary technological fixes that only exacerbate the environmental catastrophe.

The flooding in Jakarta this year was timely as Vox, a US media outlet, published a video report on Jakarta’s environmental crisis, which has caused the city to sink as fast as 25 centimeters annually. The report associates this crisis with Dutch-inherited segregated water infrastructure, massive groundwater exploitation and rapid urban development leading to a proliferation of concrete that prevents rainwater from replenishing water lost from the city’s aquifer layers.

These issues, however, cannot be solved with simple technological fixes. Rather they require a rearrangement of water governance that has proven to have failed to provide equal and sustainable access to the city’s population.

This failure is evident in three aspects: the exclusion of the urban poor from the governance process, the blurry lines between rights and responsibilities of the stakeholders, and the elite-centric decision-making process.

In an effort to do so, we can start by rethinking our water governance approach that currently focuses on the centralized water infrastructure to also incorporate a variety of everyday water practices. These have been chosen by people either because they are excluded from the network or because their access is limited due to the weak water pressure, or the unreliable and low-quality supply of the available network.

The reality of water governance in Jakarta is not reflected in the networked infrastructure that only covers 65 percent of the population with the majority of customers coming from middle to lower income households. Considering service unreliability that is not consistent with constant tariff increases, even those who are connected also fulfill their water needs either from groundwater, rainwater harvesting or bottled water.

According to the report from Amrta Institute, more than 60 percent of the city’s water needs are fulfilled by groundwater, which serves nearly two-thirds of the city’s water consumption, or around 630 million cubic metre out of 1 billion m3/year.

Unfortunately, the discussion on Jakarta’s water governance has been biased toward the centralized infrastructure, which is problematic for three main reasons. First, it reinforces a legacy of the colonial government water development planning, which is socially and geographically fragmented. This has inherently prevented the urban poor, especially those who live in informal settlements, from both accessing the piped water infrastructure and participating in the governance process.

Second, centralized piped water infrastructure is often used as a justification for private sector participation due the government’s lack of capacity to fund capital costs. However, as evident in Jakarta, neither public nor private operators have successfully ensured adequate and sustainable water service provision for the population, even those who adhere to pro-poor initiatives.

Lastly, the focus on centralized infrastructure promotes the development of big-infrastructural projects as a band-aid for the environmental catastrophe while neglecting the underlying issue of water governance failure. For example, the construction of a USD$40 billion giant sea wall to prevent seawater from overflowing into the already sinking city does not address the underlying problems and often comes at a cost of forced eviction of many informal settlements which burdens the already excluded urban poor.

Thus, there is a need to look beyond the networked water infrastructure by considering everyday water practices in which people interact within and outside the centralized infrastructure. Such practices include buying water from neighbors, collecting water from public stand-pipes, purchasing from pushcart vendors and extracting groundwater from shallow or deep wells.

Looking at these everyday practices will allow us to unveil the different manifestations of water inequalities in terms of distribution, recognition and participation. For example, research by Kooy and Furlong in 2018 found that over-abstraction of groundwater in rich neighborhoods has led to salinization of shallow groundwater and land-subsidence in poor neighborhoods, exposing the urban poor to higher risk of flooding and poorer water quality.

Equally important, paying attention to everyday water practices will not only allow us to understand the different manifestations of urban water inequality but also enable us to capture local knowledge and practices that have been filling the gap left by the centralized water infrastructure. This will counter the disempowering image of the urban poor as a passive recipient or victim of Jakarta’s unequal water governance.

This article does not seek to diminish the importance of centralized piped water infrastructure or the urgency for people to be connected to a piped water source, instead it seeks to highlight the need to look beyond the centralized network in order to develop a more holistic understanding of Jakarta’s water governance.

Hopefully, this will lead to the creation of an inclusive and sustainable urban water governance that allows for more equitable access to water, increasing recognition and larger space for participation especially for marginalized communities including the poor in informal settlements, women, migrants and the disabled.

 

This article has been published by the Jakarta Post and can also be accessed via the following link: https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2021/02/26/its-time-to-rethink-jakartas-water-governance.html

Writer : Marwa

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

The Striking Generational Divide, Explained

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Generational “finger-pointing” is not a novel concept and has existed for centuries within multitude of generations, each blaming the other for issues and ideas neither generation wants to take accountability for.  Both Gen Y (people born between the years 1980-1994) and Gen Z (people born between the years 1995-2010) have formed an alliance to push back on the older generations, specifically the Baby Boomers. A clash of ideas and a point of difference of views on society has struck tension between generations, preventing a progressive society from fully forming.

The younger generation is racially diverse, environmentally and socially conscious, and have a clear vision for how they want their future to unfold (Valencia-Garcia 2020). However, it is apparent that the ideas of the younger generations contrast sharply with older generations, who tend to reject policy reforms or ideas presented by the youth. A difference in “expectations of the future, ethics and politics” (Birnstengel 2019) has formed a generational split and prevents society from progressing entirely. The generational divide is not only based on family morals and ethics but is also an accumulation of different people living fundamentally different lives and experiencing different circumstances in general. Technology and politics are two key factors that have continually evolved through generations and have influenced generation’s perspective on society deeply (Birnstengel 2019).

Today, the debate on generationalism is centered around how a nation should look and exactly what kinds of people should be a part of that nation. Millennials and Gen Z have been defined by the rise of the internet and identity politics. They grew up with the internet, but also remember a life in analogue (Frey 2020). They have experienced economic crises and watched the War on Terror unfold, and as a result are concerned for their futures due to the large influence capitalist and traditionalist institutions still have on society (Valencia-Garcia 2020). Older generations are wanting to protect these outdated institutions that uphold their own old-fashioned values in order to push their agendas on the nation. Pew Research centre research found that the upcoming younger generation was the most ethically and racially diverse generation to date, fundamentally driving their progressive attitudes (Birnstengel 2019).

A distinct issue that has caused great generational divide is the climate crisis. Younger people across the world have grown up with more exposure to the effects of climate change than the older generations (Cohen 2019). Thus, young adults in current day are of higher concern about climate change as they understand the implications better and are more educated on the topic. The attitudes of younger generations and their beliefs has pushed an agenda to resolve the climate crisis dramatically, creating very real social change that is being reflected in policy changes around the world (Cohen 2019). Although the impacts of climate change are ever present and should be dealt with immediately, the push for policy change around the environment is a reflection of the youth’s priorities for society. Along with climate change, issues such as racial justice and social inclusivity are other examples of younger generations pushing important issues.

Older generations accuse younger generations of naivety and younger generations don’t understand their parochialism. Potentially, a middle ground could be met where older generations feel their needs are being fulfilled while society continues to progress as a whole. However, generational gaps will continue to arise if unity is not formed or perceptions do not alter to accommodate for one another

 

REFERENCES:

Birnstengel, G 2019, Boomer Blaming, Finger Pointing and The Generational Divide, Forbes, retrieved February 2 2021

Cohen, S 2019, The Age Gap in Environmental Politics, Earth Institute, Columbia University, retrieved February 2 2021

Frey, W 2020, The 2020s can end America’s generational divide in politics, Brookings, retrieved February 2 2021

Valencia-Garcia, L 2020, Understanding Today’s Generational Divide, Fair Observer, retrieved February 2 2021

Writer : Emily Camilleri

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

Military Coup 2021 and the Stalemate of Democratization Process in Myanmar

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The dream of becoming a fully democratic country is perhaps still a long way off for people in Myanmar. A coup or a seizure of power by the military has occurred, marking a sign of stalemate in the democratization process in Myanmar for the last decade. On February 1st, 2021, local news outlets and various international media reported that Aung San Suu Kyi as the state counselor and Myanmar’s de facto leader had been detained by the Myanmar military (Regan, Olarn, and Westcott, 2021). Not only Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, the leader of the government, and several other government officials have also been detained. In addition, the military also declared a state of emergency and took over power for at least the next year (DW, 2021).

 The military claims that the arrests are related to an alleged fraud in November 2020 election. In the election, The National League for Democracy, a political party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a significant victory by obtaining 396 out of 476 seats in the combined lower and upper houses of Parliament. This victory is certainly a threat in itself, at least in terms military’s guaranteed 25% parliamentary seats (Shine OO, 2021).  Although currently the conflict is still limited to the elite level, the impact of this struggle for power has begun to  spread towards citizen of Myanmar with the broadcast disruptions of the Myanmar National TV station and Myanmar National Radio. It was also reported that there was internet network disruption in the capital Yangon on Tuesday morning with network connections dropping by 75 percent (DW, 2021).

The democratic crisis that occurred in Myanmar received strong reactions from various international actors. The United States threatened to take action and ensure that Myanmar’s military would get consequences if they did not comply with democratic principles. UN Secretary General Antonio Gutieress also criticized the incident, saying that it was a serious blow for Myanmar democracy. Various criticisms have also come from international humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that have been calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and denounced access to communications and internet networks (Al Jazeera, 2021).

Myanmar’s Pseudo Democratization Process

This recent event is certainly a major stumbling block for the struggle towards democracy in Myanmar. Optimism for the creation of a democratic civilian government must now be confronted with the existence of the military which has again shown its influence in Myanmar’s political struggle of power. Whereas, after the political reforms carried out by President U Thein Sein which was marked by changing the mode of government from a total military junta to a hybrid civil-military administration in 2011, optimism for the new face of democracy in Myanmar was getting bigger, both domestically and internationally. With various concessions granted in 2011 including commitment to democratic elections and loosening media control, political spaces that have been controlled by the military were becoming an open contestation for civilians to take part in politics. The peak was in 2015 when the National League of Democracy won the election with a significant number of votes. As a result, the NLD effectively took state legislative power from the military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and officially granted the reins of executive power to civilians (Ko, 2018).

Although it appears that there has been a marked development in the democratic process after the election of civilian leaders through democratic elections in 2015, the reality is that the democratic process in Myanmar is far from being successful and completed. It even tends to appear as pseudo democratization. The point of pseudo-democratization here is that although on the surface there was a power transition from military to civilian, there has never been any attempt to reduce military power either in any level of the government. In the 2008 constitution, which is still in effect today, for example, the military is automatically guaranteed to get 25 percent of seats in the Myanmar parliament. The same constitution also states that every legislative decision must get at least 75 percent of the members of the Myanmar parliament. With the automatic allotment of 25 percent of seats for the military, it means that all forms of Myanmar legislative decisions must be approved by the Military faction in parliament to fulfil the minimum requirement of 75 percent, and the Military has the opportunity to veto all decisions discussed in the legislative process (Miclat, 2020). Moreover, the 2008 constitution also gives the Military control to key ministries such as the ministry of defense, the ministry of border affairs, and the ministry of home affairs (Turner, 2011). In addition, the military still has a strong influence on Myanmar’s bureaucracy where 90 percent of public officials and 80 percent of ambassadors are ex-military personnel, so that a more democratic political climate will be difficult to create (Ko, 2018).

To further understand the democratization process in Myanmar, we must also look at the history of the political reforms that took place in 2011. Although during that period President Thein Sein received a lot of praise from international community for his decision to encourage political liberalization that has reduced repression and created avenues for civil participation in the institutions, the main motive of the reforms is still being debated. As summarized by Bunte and Dosch (2015), political scientists see that political reform carried out by Myanmar was a “survival strategy of the quasi-military government” to overcome the danger of factionalism and to increase regime durability by creating power-sharing institutions. Several other political scientists said that this strategy was a military effort to increase Myanmar’s legitimacy in the international world as well as to improve Myanmar’s worrying socio-political conditions with international sanctions and the post-Cyclone Nargis recovery conditions that ravaged the country in 2008 (Bunte and Dosch, 2015).

By looking from the history of the democratization process in Myanmar especially related to the 2011 event, we can conclude that in fact this political reform is the result of generosity from the previous military government, therefore it is very likely that one day the military government will take back the “gift” if something does not go according to their expectations. Moreover, the bureaucratic climate in fact, which is still controlled by many military elements, will certainly make it easier for the military to mobilize its strength to take over power in the future. In contrast to other countries, for example, such as Indonesia, which demilitarized post-reform political elements in 1998 by eliminating military dual function, efforts to reduce military influence in Myanmar politics were minimal, as evidenced by the persistence of the tight military control on the aspects of Myanmar’s political life both in the legislative sector with a 25 percent military quota in parliament, as well as the quota of three important ministries in the executive sphere, namely the Ministry of Defense which has authority over Myanmar Armed Forces, Ministry of Border Affairs which controls border affairs of the country, the Ministry of Home Affairs which is in charge of administrative affairs and control of the police, narrows the space for civil society in political affairs in the country so that their resistance to political crises such as a coup became very vulnerable (Prameswaran, 2020).

From this event we can see that this military coup is an attempt by the Myanmar military to take back what they consider to be their right – full power and influence in all aspects of the life of the Myanmar people – as well as preventing the possibility of developing an external power that can rival their existence. The NLD’s landslide victory in the Myanmar elections, as well as the decline in the votes obtained by the USDP as the party backed by the military (The Irrawady, 2020), certainly is a big enough blow to the military’s existence so that they must take certain steps to maintain their power by carrying out a forced takeover of power and alleging that election fraud has occurred.

For Myanmar’s civil society, they do not have much choice but to wait for the situation to subside and hope that political stability in their country can be quickly upheld. The absence of Aung San Suu Kyi and several other civilian political figures who were detained by the military would have been a major blow to the struggle of civil society because so far they have relied on Aung San Suu Kyi as a political mouthpiece for the majority of Myanmar civil society. The strong control in every aspect of society as well as the fear of persecution, intimidation, and the silencing of freedom of speech which was marked by the shutdown of television, radio and internet broadcasts in Myanmar became an obstacle to civil society’s resistance efforts to the political crisis that was happening on their homeland.

What Myanmar Coup 2021 means for the international community?

With the limited number of actions that civil society groups can take in Myanmar, there are currently great hopes placed on the international community to be able to take certain steps to save the democratic process in that country. Criticism has already been made, but of course this will not be enough without being accompanied by firm steps that will put great pressure on the existence of military forces in Myanmar.

The biggest challenge faced by the United States as a country that has been committed to promoting and ensuring the smooth running of the democratization process around the world. Moreover, this event is the first challenge for the new government under President Joe Biden who was appointed at the beginning of the year. After the resignation of Donald Trump, who tends to have an inward looking policy, the United States is currently required to show its hegemony as a leading country, especially in the democratization process which has been their commitment. But of course these steps will not be that easy. In Myanmar’s affairs, America must face China, which has a big interest in the country, especially in the economic sector related to oil and natural gas. In contrast to the United States, which immediately gave a strong reaction, China prefers to be more careful in responding to this case while calling on the warring parties to resolve the political crisis with a peaceful manner (Wintour, 2021).

ASEAN as a regional organization and the countries that are members of it, especially Brunei Darussalam, which has just been entrusted with the ASEAN Chairmanship starting January 1, 2021 also faced the challenge of being able to help resolve this political crisis. Even though there is the principle of non-interference that must be upheld, however, ASEAN countries must be able to play an active role in efforts to prevent potential conflicts. For example, ASEAN as an organization as well as certain ASEAN countries must be able to encourage and facilitate peaceful discussions between conflicting parties if needed. In this case ASEAN is required to be able to create a just, democratic, harmonious and gender-sensitive environment in accordance with the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law in accordance with ASEAN Vision 2025. But this will not be an easy thing for ASEAN. In fact, shortly after the event there were various reactions from its member countries. Brunei as chairman of ASEAN, followed by various countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore through an official statement, has raised their concern and urged that this issue can be resolved peacefully in accordance with applicable legal principles. Even so, several countries including Cambodia and Thailand chose not to comment further and considered that this matter was an internal Myanmar affair and they considered that they had no right to interfere either in the ASEAN framework or in the bilateral framework. It will be difficult for ASEAN to think of a multilateral framework that can help resolve this crisis if its members are not in one voice in responding to this issue.

Historically, pressure from the international community has proven to be able to push for policy reforms that are considered de facto starting the democratization process in Myanmar in 2011. In the current  situation, when the people of Myanmar are again facing a political crisis caused by the excessive display of political power from the military, the role of the international community in giving pressure to the military action in Myanmar will be crucial in ensuring the political stability and the sustainability of the democratization process in Myanmar.

 

References

 

Al Jazeera. (2021). ‘Serious Blow to Democracy’: World Condemns Myanmar Military Coup. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/1/world-reacts-to-military-coup-in-myanmar

Bünte, M., & Dosch, J. (2015). Myanmar: Political Reforms and the Recalibration of External Relations. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 34(2), 3-19.

Channel News Asia. (2021). ASEAN Chair Brunei Calls for ‘Dialogue, Reconciliation and Return to Normalcy’ in Myanmar. Retrieved from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/myanmar-asean-aung-san-suu-kyi-military-coup-14087150

Deutsche Welle. (2021). Myanmar Coup: Aung San Suu Kyi Detained as Military Seizes Power. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/myanmar-coup-aung-san-suu-kyi-detained-as-military-seizes-power/a-56400678

Helen Regan, Kocha Olarn, & Westcott, B. (2021). Myanmar’s Military Seizes Power in Coup after Detaining Leader Aung San Suu Kyi and Ruling Party Politicians. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/31/world/myanmar-aung-san-suu-kyi-detained-intl/index.html

Irrawaddy, T. (2020). Myanmar’s 2020 General Election Results in Numbers. Election 2020. Retrieved from https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/myanmars-2020-general-election-results-numbers.html?fbclid=IwAR0uo7ZdreRaaGyiJ-nnXdvJqbhgYcD-pTOcT0KKGqTQerFoBHiNHwFOexk

Ko, A. K. (2018). Democratisation in Myanmar: Glue or Gloss? Retrieved from https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3d07eb88-d4f1-de81-40d1-032ec67a3cb8&groupId=288143

Miclat, G. (2020). Challenges to Democracy and Hopes for Peace and Justice in Myanmar. The Debate. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/challenges-to-democracy-and-hopes-for-peace-and-justice-in-myanmar/

Oo, A. S. (2021). Myanmar Military Denies Coup Threats over Vote Fraud Claims. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/constitutions-myanmar-elections-asia-min-aung-hlaing-1d8af462424d818f96e88dc6ed115dc1

Parameswaran, P. (2020). What Will Myanmar’s New Home Minister Mean for the Country’s Security and Politics? ASEAN Beat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/what-will-myanmars-new-home-minister-mean-for-the-countrys-security-and-politics/

Turnell, S. (2012). Myanmar in 2011: Confounding Expectations. Asian Survey, 52(1), 157-164.

Wintour, P. (2021). Myanmar Coup: US and China Divided in Response to Army Takeover. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/01/myanmar-coup-us-and-china-divided-in-response-to-army-takeover-aung-san-suu-kyi

Writer : Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

RCEP: Peril or Impetus for a Greater ASEAN Regionalism?

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Against the backdrop of global pandemic, ASEAN successfully held its 37th summit from 12-15 November 2020. During the four days course of the conference, ASEAN members mainly discussed multilateral cooperation to recover from pandemic and the tension that was escalating in the region, notably in the South China Sea months prior to the conference. In the midst of rising tension, ASEAN reaches a historic milestone with the signing of Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement/RCEP. The trade agreement unites ten ASEAN member states, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia under the same flagship—countries that previously cooperated under ASEAN +6 excluding India.

The trade pact that comprises of 15 countries across Asia-Pacific and covers almost a third of the world population is regarded as the world’s biggest trade agreement, next after the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement and European Union. Other than the sheer number of the countries participating in this agreement, the mega-regional agreement also demonstrates the feats of bridging three East Asian countries—China, Japan, and South Korea that are traditionally reluctant to engage under the same economic framework—with its counterparts in Western Pacific. The agreement is expected to progressively cut down the already low tariff among member countries and incentivize investment flow when it finally comes into effect (Lee, 2020). Vietnam, a country that has been profoundly affected by rivalry between the United States and China in the region, is optimistic about the cooperation.

Final negotiation of RCEP coincides with two important momenta that highly affect the region: economic recession prompted by the Covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing power transition in the United States after the presidential election. Despite its feat on uniting Asia-Pacific under the same trading platform, many actors view RCEP in a skeptical way, including India that was originally involved in the deal’s formulation but withdrew during the negotiation last year. India’s approach also reflects the growing animosity towards China, especially after the border clash in Himalaya early in May. Some commentators view that RCEP signals a growing Chinese dominance over Asia-Pacific, including ASEAN that has long become a battle ground between great powers. Reuter and Wall Street Journal, for instance, labelled the RCEP as the ‘China-backed trade deal’ that will eventually pose a threat to ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific countries (Pearson, 2020; Emont & Gale, 2020).

Reflection of China’s Growing Influence?

The making of RCEP has undergone a lengthy debate for eight years since it was first introduced in 2012. Prior to RCEP, several ASEAN member states and Asia-Pacific countries have been cooperating under several trade agreements; one is the Trans-Pacific Partnership/TPP that was led by the US in 2016. TPP was the emanation of Barack Obama’s strategic pivot to Asia. TPP originally became the biggest trade deal in the region by covering almost 40% of the world’s economy and—as the name suggests—bridging countries across the Pacific Ocean, from Brazil, Chile, Mexico, to Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia (Gong, 2020, p. 40).  However, under the presidency of Donald Trump, the US withdrew from the agreement, arguing that the deal will ultimately lead to decline of US manufacture and lower wages for domestic workers. As a consequence, US withdrawal left the vacuum in the Asia-Pacific that was later seized by its rival (Gong, 2020, p. 45). In later remarks, China hailed RCEP as a win for its side. “The signing of the RCEP is not only a monumental achievement in East Asian regional cooperation, but more important, a victory of multilateralism and free trade,” said China Premier Li Keqiang.

Compared to TPP and its evolution, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), RCEP is less rigorous. It puts a lower standard on policy harmonization. RCEP also doesn’t mention certain standards over labor rights or environmental protections that were covered in CPTPP. Different standards, however, are understandable since RCEP tries to bridge diverse economies, starting from the highly developed countries like Japan and Australia to developing economies like Cambodia and Laos in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the huge economic gap between countries in RCEP make some commentators believe that it will give harm to some countries in ASEAN. Big margin in economic capability will make the developed industries like China and Japan reap the most from this agreement and consequently make the economic gap within ASEAN countries exacerbated. “Who, actually, are gaining benefit from this project” is the focal point over the current debate. The RCEP and trans-Pacific Deal “together will offset global losses from the U.S.-China trade war, although not for China and the United States,” stated Petri & Plummer (2020).

Previously, China already had a number of bilateral trade agreements with members of RCEP, including ASEAN countries. However, RCEP marks a historic moment when, for the first time, the world’s second largest economy signed up in a regional multilateral trade pact. It’s without mentioning China’s geopolitics opponent—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—also included in this agreement. Despite its less rigorous standard, the sheer size of RCEP is showing its significance over Asia-Pacific political constellation. Rather than economic cooperation in itself, RCEP symbolizes a bigger geopolitics and diplomatic triumph over the region. Kishore Mahbubani, former Singapore minister of foreign affairs also pointed out during one of the Global Town Hall (GTH) panels, “RCEP is the sign of China’s victory.” Being excluded in the process, RCEP delivers a strong message to the United States that Southeast Asia and other Asian countries are growing more solid on defining their own relations. As former U.S. Trade Representative Wendy Cutler noted in his commentary,

 “RCEP is another reminder that our Asian trading partners have developed a confidence about working together without the United States (Cutler, 2020).”

Ushering the ASEAN Centrality

ASEAN countries have long been polarized when it comes to defining their approach towards China. While China is currently the biggest trading partner in the region, each country shows various degrees of cooperation or hostility toward the country. Laos, Cambodia, and other Mekong Basin countries are highly dependent, whereas countries like Malaysia, the Philippines, and including Indonesia are facing opposition both from domestic forces and policy makers. RCEP demonstrates that ASEAN countries can reach the consensus on formulating economic partnership with a partner that traditionally cooperates by using bilateral channels, including with Australia, New Zealand, and other East Asian countries that are linked under ASEAN+6 platform. RCEP can further push ASEAN regionalism, primarily on how it develops the existing ties with the additional ASEAN+6 economic cooperation.

Moreover, the signing of RCEP also asserts ASEAN’s position on defining countries relations in Asia-Pacific. Contrary to the previously mentioned opinion, some analysts argue that RCEP is a win for ASEAN’s middle power diplomacy. Given the diverse members of the mega-trade pact, neither China nor Japan as a traditional trade leader will become the architect of this agreement when it finally comes into effect. Rivalry between great powers that also pose a danger in the security aspect of the region will necessitate a different approach to bring RCEP further. Speaking in GWT, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, also stated that through RCEP, “China firmly supports the ASEAN centrality.”  ASEAN’s neutrality—emanated in last year’s ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific—in this context, will ultimately take a greater role in shaping RCEP when it comes into effect. Thus, the label “China-led agreement” is inaccurate. It was previously shown in 2012 when a stalemate over negotiation was resolved by ASEAN. Instead of being led by China, as many commentators suggest, RCEP exhibits a triumph for ASEAN. As Petri and Plummer (2020b) pointed out in Brookings,

“Without such ‘ASEAN centrality,’ RCEP might never have been launched.”  

Apart from recovering from the post-pandemic economic downturn, RCEP also expected to offset the harms caused by the years-long trade war between the United States and China. Especially for ASEAN countries that have long been affected by the rivalry, including Vietnam that hosted the ASEAN summit this year. In short, despite its less rigorous standards, RCEP can further incentivize the global value chain within the region. ASEAN, in particular, is projected to gain $19 billion annually by 2030 through this agreement (Petri & Plummer, 2020a)

Due to its volume and modesty compared to the previous trade pact, RCEP will take years before it finally comes into effect. It can also face a challenge upon the ratification in each member country, especially in the country with growing anti-China or anti-international sentiment. Malaysia, for instance, cancelled two of Belt and Road Initiatives projects after Mahathir Muhammad won the election on 2018. Regardless of its impact, RCEP will ultimately cement the position of ASEAN in a greater Asia-Pacific dynamic. The overall process and finalization of this agreement signify the message that ASEAN cannot be seen narrowly as the battle ground between the so-called ‘two great powers.’ Instead, RCEP denotes ASEAN’s rising primacy in defining their own region.

 

REFERENCES

Brookings. (2020, November 16). RCEP: A new trade agreement that will shape global economics and politics. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-agreement-that-will-shape-global-economics-and-politics/

Cutler, W. (2020, November 15). RCEP Agreement: Another Wake-up Call for the United States on Trade. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/rcep-agreement-another-wake-call-united-states-trade

Emont, J., & Gale, A. (2020, November 13). Asia-Pacific Countries Push to Sign China-Backed Trade Megadeal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/asia-pacific-countries-push-to-sign-china-backed-megadeal-11605265208

Gong, X. (2020). China’s Economic Statecraft. Security Challenges, 16(3), pp. 39-46.

Lee, Y. N. (2020, November 15). ‘A coup for China’: Analysts react to the world’s largest trade deal that excludes the U.S. https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/rcep-15-asia-pacific-countries-including-china-sign-worlds-largest-trade-deal.html

Pearson, J. (2020, November 11). Asian leaders to sign China-backed trade deal amid U.S. election uncertainty. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-summit/asian-leaders-to-sign-china-backed-trade-deal-amid-u-s-election-uncertainty-idUSKBN27R0QJ

Petri, A. P., & Plummer, M. G. (2020, June). East Asia decouples from the United States: Trade war, COVID-19, and East Asia’s new trade blocs. https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/east-asia-decouples-united-states-trade-war-covid-19-and-east-asias-new

Writer : Arrizal A. Jaknanihan

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

The Diminishing Reputability of Police in the United States, Explained.

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A body invented to protect the masses has become an enemy to the very people whom they serve. The relationship between the US police and its citizens is a complicated matter which in recent years has become more prevalent in international discussions. Reoccurring instances of unnecessary contact and misuse of power from law enforcement have caught the attention of the US citizens and all those watching on around the world. A lack of accountability has created general mistrust, and it is clear that if reform does not occur to resolve the systemic issues that have arisen within the core of the police, the interrelation of law enforcement and the people of the United States will deteriorate further, and rapidly.

The unconventional dynamic between the citizens of the United States and its police force can be dated back to the establishment of police in America, and the responsibilities policemen were given at the time. Fundamentally, policing in Colonial America was established to keep communities in order. As society progressed, police duties grew. Eventually, as evident in modern day, police have been empowered to protect their own power and privilege most commonly in situations that allow them to exert social control over minority groups. A large aspect of tension between the police force and US citizens is the indisputable documentation of racially targeting people of colour. Slave patrols, during the colonial era, were forms of police who were responsible for punishing slaves who tried to free themselves (Romero 2020). Historically, police have had duties that inexplicitly target certain groups and have been authorised to use force with those who are not equal to them – including people of colour, low-income communities and minority groups. These factors are able to give context for the current behaviour of police officers in the United States today.

A very significant period of time that heightened tension between police and the people of the US was the aggressive response from police during the Black Lives Matter protests. After the death of George Floyd, a peaceful, wrongly accused man of colour who was pinned beneath police officers so forcefully he was unable to continue breathing, the world united to protest against police brutality specifically towards people of colour. Internationally, it was recognised that police in the United States are ignorant to the concept of equality. Research from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project found that 93 per cent of the 7,750 Black Lives Matter protests were peaceful. However, images of violent protests were what made media headlines, with the then-president Donald Trump referring to the protesters as “thugs” (Cineas 2021). Over 427 arrests were made at the peak of the protests, despite the high number of protests being conducted in peace.

In comparison, law enforcement failed to keep white-supremacist rioters at Capitol Hill under control, through blatant complicity.  The lack of both physical presence and hostility at the Capitol riot that was so clearly present at the Black Lives Matter protests has reinforced anger within the American people. Such rioters smashed windows and scaled walls, however only 69 people were arrested (North 2021). Videos taken during the riot display officers “holding hands of extremists, escorting them down steps, holding the doors of the Capitol open for them and taking selfies with them” (Cineas 2021). The clear contrast of events and reactions from the police can be seen as a combination of ignorance and racial bias. It is evident that although police were aware of the extent of the event due to it being posted on social media, they chose to support the notion of white entitlement and as a result encouraged dangerous extremists to express their opinions in the most violent way possible without serious consequence.

The path forward is complex. However, in order to mend the relationship between law enforcement and the citizens reforms must be introduced (Jabali, 2020). Firstly, systemic issues within police training and recruitment must be addressed. Police should be reminded what their role in society is, and how violent riots should prompt a different reaction to non-violent protests. Implicit-bias training should be mandated in police academy, to attempt eradicating the clear racial prejudice towards minority groups. Although it is not simple to convince everyone to think the same way, if the police force project and openly support this view then the future generation of law enforcement will carry on this important, egalitarianist mindset.

REFERENCES:

Cineas, F (2021), Whiteness is at the core of the insurrection. Retrieved 13 January, from https://www.vox.com/2021/1/8/22221078/us-capitol-trump-riot-insurrection

Romero, D (2020), Reimaging the role of Police. Retrieved 13 January, from https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/reimagining-the-role-of-police/

North, A (2021), Police Bias explains the Capitol Riot. Retrieved 13 January, from https://www.vox.com/22224765/capitol-riot-dc-police-officers

Jabali, M (2020), If you’re surprised by how the police are acting, you don’t understand US history. Retrieved 13 January, from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/05/police-us-history-reform-violence-oppression

Writer : Emily Camilleri

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti

The Capitol Riot: a New Normal for US Democracy?

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The political situation in the United States has earned another spotlight after a mass riot that occurred in the capital city of Washington DC. Thousands of people stormed the Capitol Building of the United States, which was the venue for the US Congress meeting, which would certify Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump in the 2020 election. In that incident, supporters of Donald Trump tried to stop the meeting, triggering clashes with authorities. It was reported that the mob succeeded occupying the Capitol Building, causing the congress meeting to be declared a recess and its members were evacuated (Koob, 2021). There were about five casualties and 50 people were arrested (Ortiz, Bacon, Yancey- Bragg and Culver, 2021). After the incident, Mayor of Washington DC, Muriel Bowser declared a state of emergency for 15 days with the possibility of extending the status if things were not deemed to be improving.

What happened was certainly a surprise to people of the United States and the international community. The United States, which has been regarded as a pilot in implementing democracy, had illustrated what should not be carried out in a democratic process. This criticism certainly come with reasons. For world leaders, this is certainly an alarm that the US was shaken by this event. The attack on democracy in the US could also mean an attack on democracy all around the world. If this kind of riot could happen in an established democratic country like the US, this could also happen in other parts of the world. (Bennhold & Myers, 2021). From this incident, a big question arises, will this kind of condition become a new normal for the implementation of democracy in the US?

Trump Political Communication Strategy and the Cause of the Riots

To understand the context of the political turmoil that occurred, we can track the history back to the 2016 elections when Donald Trump ran for president of the United States. In his campaign, Donald Trump relied on his Post-Truth style of communication to garner sympathy from his supporters. With the help of right-wing media and social media that personally launched their versions of truth narratives. The concept of post truth itself is not new to the world of politics. Oxford Dictionaries explains that Post-Truth is a state in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.  Moreover, from recent studies of scholars it is concluded that the post-truth world emerged as a result of societal mega-trends such as: a decline in social capital, growing economic inequality, increased polarization, declining trust in science, and an increasingly fractionated media landscape (Lewandowsky, Elker, and Cook, 2017). Trump polarized the masses and divides the public through the information channels he has, both social media and right-wing mass media, which had so far fully supported the formation of good public opinion on  Trump.

Trump played this post-truth concept actively not only during his campaign period in 2016 , but also during his tenure as president. Over the past four years, Trump had fed his supporters with the narratives they want to hear, even though the truth of these narratives had been either questioned or proven wrong. Data from the Washington Post states that during his presidency, Trump issued an average of fifty false narratives every day (Kesser, Rizo, and Kelly, 2020). Unfortunately, the concept of post-truth political communication was still being implemented until the 2020 election when Trump was defeated in a political contest against Biden. On this occasion, Trump narrated that there was fraud that made him lost his vote in the election process while at the same time refusing to recognize Biden’s victory. For the past two months Trump had misinformed his supporters that his defeat was unfair.

The group of Trump supporters that felt the result was unfair carried out a riot in the Capitol as an expression of their dissatisfaction with the legal system they consider unfair. Armed with their embraced beliefs, they believed their values should apply in that country. According to Paige in his article titled Political Orientation and Riot Participation (2017), riot actors are mostly found in community groups with high level of information on political issues, but have low trust on government or authority. This explanation illustrates what happened in the riot. A group of people who feel they have a lot of information about political realities (even though those were questionable informations) showed dissatisfaction towards the government and feelt more competent to carry out political process than the authority.

A New Normal for US Democracy?

The biggest question is whether this kind of incident will become the new normal for political process in the US? Riots themselves are not something new in the US. Since the beginning of US history, riots and violent political actions have been rhetorically symbolize acts of patriotism that support freedom and independence (Jackson, 2020). This also applies to riots related to general elections. Riots have happened a lot, especially before the second world war. However, this is the first time an unrest has occurred at the national level, especially with regard to issues with presidential elections, which is a symbol of democratic supremacy in the US.

Trump as the most responsible figure for this riot may not last much longer. Currently, Trump no longer has the institutional backing or legitimacy supporting him. Even his own party has now turned to condemn him after the riot in Washington DC. Republican figures such as Senator Richard Burr of North Carolina criticized Trump’s campaign promoting a conspiracy theory that sparked unrest. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton also urged Trump to immediately admit defeat and stop spreading fake news (Dennis and Dillard, 2021). Therefore, Trump’s existence as an individual is no longer a cause for concern in the future.

Something noteworthy is the legitimacy of the socio-political conditions left by Trump. America is now divided into several political spectrum. The society is polarized based on their values and beliefs. It is dangerous that a lot of people prefer to cling to the truth they want to believe instead of the facts. As long as these differences have not been harmonized, and the community continues to cling to their respective beliefs by ignoring facts and common sense, it is not impossible that they will continue to raise their voices in various ways including riots. Moreover, if later authority failed to give deterrence, people who perpetrated the riot would repeat their actions in the future. On the other hand, those who oppose this incident would lose their trust in the government if they considered them to have failed enforcing the law and create security stability for the citizens. The public is also responsible to prevent figures like Trump, who carry out the post-truth concept and have a “go big or go home” mentality, from being given the stage to carry out their actions. Society should learn a lesson that such person is a threat for democracy

 The US’ condition as it is today will be a big homework for President-elect Joe Biden, who will carry out the mandate for the next four years. Biden must be able to become president for every community. The elected president must be able to embrace people trapped in the post-truth illusion created by Trump. Activities that tend to alienate Trump supporters as well as people with different political views will backfire on Biden and his administration as the group will have stronger legitimacy to launch future unrest under the pretext of political discrimination from the government in power. For this reason, Biden must convince everyone that the essence of democracy must be carried out in peace and  dignity for all the people of the US. If this process is successful, the attack on the Capitol will only end up as a special case in the history of US democracy. On the other hand, if Biden fails to embrace and improve the condition, it is not impossible that this kind of protest will become a new normal in US democracy.

 

References

Bennhold, K., & Myers, S. (2021). America’s Friends and Foes Express Horror as Capitol Attack ‘Shakes the World’. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/world/europe/trump-capitol-2020-election-mob.html

Dennis, S., & Dillard, J. (2021). Republicans Recoil From Trump as Violence Proves Too Much. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-07/capitol-violence-marks-opening-for-gop-to-distance-from-trump

Jackson, K. (2020). The Double Standard of the American Riot. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/06/riots-are-american-way-george-floyd-protests/612466/

Kessler, G., Rizzo, S., & Kelly, M. (2020). Trump is averaging more than 50 false or misleading claims a day. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/22/president-trump-is-averaging-more-than-50-false-or-misleading-claims-day/

Koob, S. (2021). What we know so far about the storming of the US Capitol. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/us-protests-what-we-know-so-far-about-the-storming-of-the-capitol-20210107-p56sa1.html

Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U., & Cook, J. (2017). Beyond Misinformation: Understanding and Coping with the “Post-Truth” Era. Journal Of Applied Research In Memory And Cognition, 6(4), 353-369. doi: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.07.008

Ortiz, Bacon, Yancey- Bragg, & Culver. (2021). DC riots live updates: Capitol Police officer dies from injuries; FBI offers $50K reward for pipe bomb suspect info. Retrieved 8 January 2021, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/01/07/washington-dc-capitol-trump-riots-day-after-live-updates/6577841002/

Paige, J. (1971). Political Orientation and Riot Participation. American Sociological Review, 36(5), 810. doi: 10.2307/2093668

Writer : Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Editor : Angganararas Indriyosanti