



# FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW #86

1 FEBRUARY - 15 FEBRUARY 2025

#### ENSURING INDONESIA'S SUSTAINABLE NICKEL DOMINANCE AMID TRUMP'S EV POLICY REVERSAL

Indonesia has established itself as a dominant player in the global nickel market, holding the largest reserves globally at 55 million tons as of 2023 (CNBC, 2025). The government has implemented policies like banning raw nickel ore exports since 2020 and mandating domestic processing (IEA, 2024). Nevertheless, despite these efforts, Indonesia faces significant challenges in maintaining supply and ensuring long-term sustainability. U.S. President Trump's repeal of the EV mandate targeting 50% of new cars as electric by 2030 and halting \$5 billion in EV charging infrastructure funding (CNN, 2025) have raised concerns. This policy could reduce refined nickel demand and lower global prices due to oversupply.

However, Indonesia's nickel downstreaming is unlikely to be significantly affected. Global nickel demand remains strong due to the energy transition prioritised in many regions, such as the EU and Asian countries. China dominates Indonesia's nickel export market, absorbing 80–85% of its exports, with South Korea also playing a significant role (Hidayatullah, 2024). These markets remain committed to energy transition and EV adoption, providing a strong buffer against U.S. policy changes (Hidayatullah, 2025). This dominance of the Asian market ensures strong demand for Indonesian nickel as the main material for EV batteries.

If global demand slows, nickel price fluctuations may pressure Indonesian producers' profit margins. To address this, Indonesia must continue to strengthen its domestic nickel downstreaming efforts (IEA, 2024), enhance technological innovation, and invest in renewable energy sources for refining processes. Diversifying export markets to regions that remain committed to the energy transition is also crucial to mitigate risks while maintaining its competitive position in the global nickel supply chain. (Ernani Dewi Kusumawati, Master of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada)

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#### SAFEGUARDING CHAOS IN WESTERN MYANMAR: THAILAND'S SHOT IN DEVISING HUMANITARIAN CORRIDOR

The 2021 Myanmar Coup was the beginning of a four-year-long civil war and atrocities. The post-coup scenes follow state-induced violence, causing displacements and mass resistance movements (Stokke & Kyaw, 2023). Unfortunately, recent airstrikes on Western Myanmar have shown the junta government's unwillingness to stop (Naing, 2025). Attempts by various institutions were made, but what is lacking most from those attempts are paths to deliver humanitarian assistance.

March 2024 saw Thailand's first wave of humanitarian assistance delivered to Western Myanmar (Strangio, 2024). It was the beginning of a 'Humanitarian Corridor,' an ASEAN-backed aid initiative initiated by the Thai government in coordination with the Thai and Myanmar Red Cross Society (Thai Foreign Ministry, 2024). The initiative aims to distribute relief to Displaced Persons in Myanmar. It is indeed of good intent and cause, but sceptics doubt its longevity due to its lack of continuous engagement and scope limitation (Phaicharoen, 2024).

However, it is essential to note that humanitarian needs in Myanmar were largely unmet until 2023 (Holliday et al., 2025). Hence, this attempt at least starts to fill the empty glass cup, although doubts need to be shed to ensure accountability of said aid. This effort may be vulnerable to the interpretation of pragmatic politicization to pertain to the state's dignity that was being subjected to the failure of containing Myanmar's civil conflict. However, regardless of it, this step is indeed an actual act for the side-lined, pigeon-holed conflict of post-coup Myanmar. (Hemalia Kusumadewi, Department of International Relations, Universitas Brawijaya)

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## TRUMP'S FIRST DAY IN OFFICE: THE US WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT

Immediately after his inauguration on January 20, 2025, Donald Trump signed an executive order withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement and other similar commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (The White House, 2025). Such action has sparked responses from numerous countries and organizations, given the consequences of climate change have caused prolonged drought and food insecurity in the African region while rising sea levels in the Pacific posed threats to the existence of island nations (Almulhim et al., 2024).

In 2017, Trump took a similar action by withdrawing the US from the agreement before Biden reversed this decision in 2021. The US withdrawal again raises fears of a domino effect by encouraging other countries to step back from this effort. Without the commitments previously stated through the agreement, it is feared that US carbon emissions will become uncontrolled since the country has already been the second largest carbon emitter in the world, with 4.9 billion metric tons of emissions in 2023 (Global Carbon Project, 2024). In contrast, the total emissions from all African countries combined amount to only a quarter of the US total emissions (IEA, 2019). This highlights that the Global South is undeniably the most disadvantaged party despite its minimal contribution to the cause of climate change.

The US attitude has undermined the collective efforts to combat climate change, which tragically affects the Global South. Today, protecting the environment from further damage requires the cooperation of all parties, particularly the Global North. (Parama Kirti Wiyanto, International Relations 2021, Universitas Gadjah Mada)

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